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INTEGRATION IN THE 1980s: THE DREAM OF
DIVERSITY AND THE CYCLE OF EXCLUSION
STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN*
Judge John Minor Wisdom has been described as a cham-
pion of the "complete disestablishment of segregation." 1 As the
author of many leading desegregation decisions in the 1960s,2
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco; Visiting Professor, 1989-1990,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B. 1970, J.D. 1973, Stanford
University.
Throughout this Article, I refer to "people of color, women, gays, and lesbians" as
people who face discrimination. The phrasing suggests that people of color are male, that
women are white, and that gays and lesbians have no race. However, these terms are not
mutually exclusive. For example, a person of color might be a heterosexual woman, a
lesbian, a heterosexual man, or a gay man.
Our language reflects the dominant cultural privileging of whiteness, maleness, and
heterosexuality. We cannot combat this preference without identifying race, sex, and
sexual preference (and probably other personal attributes) more often than we are
accustomed to doing. I have wrestled unsuccessfully with this language problem.
Although I do not have an answer, I ask the reader to try to avoid making essentialist
assumptions.
The author thanks her spring 1987 Race and Sex Discrimination class at Stanford Law
School and her spring 1987 Sex Discrimination class at USF for inspiration; Diane
Bessette, Hastings College of Law, class of 1990, and Susan Lee Lubeck, Stanford Law
School, class of 1989, for outstanding research assistance and support; and Barbara
Babcock, Patricia Bryan, Patricia Cain, Kim Crenshaw, John Denvir, Dolores Donovan,
Mary Dunlap, Trina Grlo, Catharine Wells Hantzis, Herma Hill Kay, Chuck Lawrence,
Chris Littleton, Jean Love, Fran Olsen, Charles Reich, Deborah Rhode, and Patricia
Williams for continuing to provide the sense of community-both intellectual and
emotional-needed to write this Article.
1. Brennan, "Dispositions That Are Lovely':" In Tribute to Judge John Minor Wisdom,
60 TUL. L. REv. 237, 238 (1985).
2. See, ag., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (1966),
aff'dper curiam, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); United States v.
Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
Jefferson formally implemented the holding of Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S.
294 (1955), by finding that the desegregation standards of the United States Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare were within the rationale of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Brown. Jefferson, 372 F.2d at 862. Jefferson also held that the
Constitution compels formerly de jure segregated public school systems to shift to unitary,
nonracial systems with or without federal funds. Id. at 850. This meant that states have an
affirmative duty to furnish fully integrated education to black children. Id. at 846-47 & n.5,
868. Jefferson also noted a need for a system-wide policy of integration to redress the
previous overt system-wide policy of segregation. Id. at 869.
Louisiana invalidated a state constitutional requirement that citizens registering to
vote be able to understand and give a reasonable interpretation of any section of the
Louisiana or United States Constitution. Louisiana held that this requirement violated the
1625
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Judge Wisdom recognized the harm of segregation, which he
described as "[d]enial of access to the dominant culture, lack of
opportunity in any meaningful way to participate in political and
other public activities, [and] the stigma of apartheid condemned
in the Thirteenth Amendment." 3 Another serious harm of seg-
regation is the denial to the dominant culture of access to the
insights of the segregated culture. Judge Wisdom's recognition
of the harmful effects of segregation fueled his sense of justice in
enforcing the constitutional mandate of desegregation.
Commentators have agreed that his role in the battle for
integration in the '60s was of pivotal importance.4 And thus it is
appropriate as a tribute to this influential desegregationist judge
to look at integration in the '80s and the ways in which the
problems of denial of access, lack of opportunity, and stigma
have continued to surface as the struggle to achieve integration
has continued on new battlefronts with a different vocabulary.
One place, close to home, in which the dream of integration
has not been fulfilled is within the cloister of legal academia.
This Article singles out legal education as an illustration of the
dream of integration and the cycle of exclusion. A description of
the issues, as they arise in legal academia, both provides an
example that many lawyers, judges, and professors know well
and portrays the complexity of the exclusionary dynamic. Judge
Wisdom has recognized the importance of faculty integration to
achieving student desegregation within formerly segregated
Southern schools. 6 The necessity for faculty integration at the
14th amendment due process and equal protection clauses, as well as the 15th amendment.
Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. at 391-92. The court held that a law which is nondiscriminatory
on its face violates the equal protection clause if it is applied and administered unequally.
Id. at 359.
3. Jefferson, 372 F.2d at 866.
4. See Read, The Penman of the Court: A Tribute to John Minor Wisdom, 60 TUL. L.
REv. 264, 264 (1985) ("More often than not, John Minor Wisdom was the penman,
architect, and genius who wrote the seminal decisions that integrated the public schools of
the Deep South."); see also Tuttle, In Tribute to John Minor Wisdom-Foreword, 60 TUL.
L. REv. 231, 233 (1985) ("Judge Wisdom's most admired and most important decisions
were, of course, in the broad field of civil rights, primarily racial civil rights.").
5. For two early articles imploring the legal academy to review its hiring processes,
see Kay, The Need for Self-Imposed Quotas in Academic Employment, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
137, and Lwrence, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for Voluntary
Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 429 (1986).
6. Judge Wisdom has referred to the importance of faculty integration many times..
See, eg., Jefferson, 372 F.2d at 883 ("Faculty integration is essential to student-
desegregation."); id. at 892 ("until school authorities recognize and carry out their
affirmative duty to integrate faculties as well as facilities, there is not the slightest possibility
of their ever establishing an operative non-discriminatory school system"); id. at 884
1626 [Vol. 64
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law school level to assist in achieving integration of the legal
profession is no less compelling.
Nondiscrimination is the law7 and a goal upon which all
agree in theory. This Article examines some of the obstacles to
achieving that goal of nondiscrimination, using the example of
law faculty hiring. Antidiscrimination law requires "victims"
who file charges against "perpetrators." '8  Yet the collegial eti-
quette of the academy (and of many other societal institutions)
(" 'faculty segregation encourages pupil segregation and is detrimental to achieving a
constitutionally required non-racially operated school system' ") (quoting Clark v. Board
of Educ., 369 F.2d 661, 669 (8th Cir. 1966)). The importance of faculty integration is also
referred to in the footnotes to Jefferson. Id. at 846 n.4, 867 n.67.
7. There is no dearth of statutory pronouncement that nondiscrimination is the law.
For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 704, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 78 Stat.
257 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982)), prohibits discrimination by an
employer against an employee on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin.
In 1972 Title VII was amended to expand the coverage of the Act to include public
employers and educational institutions. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
§ 8(a)-(b), Pub. L. No. 92-261, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1982)). Another amendment, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)k
(1982), established that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex discrimination.
The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 67 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982)), prohibits discrimination between employees on the basis of
sex by paying different wage rates for equal work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and
responsibility under the same working conditions.
The Education Amendments Act of 1972, Title IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 373, Pub. L. No.
92-318 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988), as amended by the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259), provides that no person, on the basis of sex,
shall be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance.
Executive Order No. 11,246, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R., 1966-
1970 COMPILATON, 684 (1974), requires that the Secretary of Labor ensure that all
contracts with the federal government over $10,000 include clauses whereby the contractor
agrees (I) not to "discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"; and (2) to "take affirmative action to ensure
that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without
regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Id. at 685.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), provides a federal cause of
action for enforcing the provisions of the 14th amendment when state action or laws are
inadequate.
The 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution states,
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
For a list of state statutory provisions that prohibit sex discrimination in education, see
B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW-
THE IMPACT OF THE ERA ON STATE LAW 249-302 (1977).
8. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination
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requires that accusations of discrimination not be made. Even if
they are made, the deliberations leading to appointments and
tenure decisions are cloaked in the secrecy of academic freedom
and collegial communications. 9
While protecting academic freedom is important, the dis-
crimination plaintiff, who is faced with law and cases that
require her to articulate who said what, when, and for what pur-
pose, must pierce the protective veil or lose her case. Even with
access to otherwise confidential files, the discrimination plaintiff
may not be able to document the group dynamics that resulted
in the tenuring or hiring decision.10 Group dynamics, which are
rarely articulated in written form, are hard to capture and to
articulate at the conscious level required for litigation.1 Yet
these group interrelations operate as a sub-text to any faculty
hiring or tenure decision.
Integrating the academy by lawsuits may be not only diffi-
cult, but also not as effective as less litigious approaches through
voluntary action. Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) President Herma Hill Kay recently- reminded law
school professors that "[t]hree AALS Presidents-Susan West-
erberg Prager, Victor G. Rosenblum, and Richard Huber-have
stressed the importance and value to legal education of a com-
mitment to achieving diversity among the faculty."1 2 Kay's arti-
cle sought to continue past efforts to legitimate faculty diversity,
describing the faltering progress of legal academia to recruit and
retain professors who are people of color, women, gay, or
lesbian. 13
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57
(1978) (explaining the perpetrator perspective of antidiscrimination law).
9. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 58 U.S.L.W. 4093 (1990), the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that a university can be compelled to turn over tenure files without
proof that the confidential documents will further plaintiff's discrimination case. Several
universities, defehiding their vision of academic freedom, filed briefs supporting the
confidentiality of the tenure process. Carmody, Secrecy and Tenure: -An Issue for High
Court, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1989, B14, col. 1.
10. The rules of a law faculty surrounding a hiring decision can be characterized as a
microlegal system. See infra notes 169-83 and accompanying text.
11. See, eg., Reisman, Looking, Staring and Glaring: Microlegal Systems and Public
Order, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 165, 175 (1983) ("Research into microlegal systems is
perforce different from other legal inquiries. The norms are unwritten, uncodified and
often consciously unperceived.").
12. Kay, Presidentes Message-Beyond Diversity: Accepting Differences, AALS
NEWSL., Apr. 1989, at 1, 1.
13. Id. At the 1990 Annual Meeting in San Francisco, the AALS amended its bylaws
to require a member school to provide "equality of opportunity in legal education for all
1628 [Vol. 64
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Noting that members of these groups have suffered from a
long history of exclusion and are entering a profession that has
been "traditionally dominated by white men," Kay concluded
that "those who have been the insiders must be sensitive to their
unspoken assumptions about the newcomers. A commitment to
diversity cannot succeed without the willingness to hear, under-
stand, and accept their different voices.' 1 4 Acknowledging that
acceptance will not be easy, Kay reminded faculty that diversity
will bring "intellectual richness" to legal education. 5
Kay's point that faculty diversity enhances the educational
institution is important. Many view the goal of affirmative
action, or of diversity, as it is now often called to avoid the
stigma associated with the term affirmative action, 6 as one of
aesthetic balance-we all need a person of color, a woman, a
persons, including faculty and employees with respect to hiring, continuation, promotion
and tenure, applicants for admission, enrolled students, and graduates, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
age, handicap or disability, or sexual orientation." AALS Bylaws § 6-4(a). The amended
bylaws thus provide for nondiscrimination as to all listed categories.
Additionally, the bylaws provide, "A member school shall seek to have a faculty, staff;
and student body which are diverse with respect to race, color, and sex. A member school
may pursue additional affirmative action objectives." Id. § 6-4(c). This section requires
member schools to pursue diversity as to race, color, and sex, but not as to the other
categories. The failure to include sexual orientation in this list may be the result of a desire
to protect applicants' privacy. That exclusion, and the omission of religion and disability,
should not suggest that nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or religion or
disability is any less important than nondiscrimination based on the other categories listed.
14. Kay, supra note 12, at 3.
15. Id.
16. Affirmative action means different things to different people. To some it has
meant hiring a less qualified person from a minority group rather than a more qualified
white male. See Oppenheimer, Distinguishing Five Models of Affirmative Action, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 42 (1988).
Affirmative action thus carries with it the connotation of the dominant culture helping
the exception or the token who really does not fit into a particular role; this special
treatment therefore appears stigmatizing. This meaning implies a still dominant group
acting affirmatively to bring in the outsider, just as integration carried the connotation of an
inferior group being "integrated into" the superior group.
Diversity is a preferable term because it is a positive way to describe the importance of
our institutions being representative of all citizens and truly democratic, rather than
picturing one group as dominant. Diversity affirms the notion that different groups need
not conform to the dominant culture, need not mix into it to be an accepted and important
part of it. The concept of diversity undermines the notion of hierarchy that is implicit in
the heritage of integration and affirmative action.
For an excellent discussion of affirmative action in the context of women,
characterizing it as a reform designed to integrate women into the free market, see Olsen,
The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1497, 1548-55 (1983).
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gay, or lesbian colleague, lest we look bad. 17 But much more is
at stake here than appearances or even our view of ourselves as
nonracist, nonsexist, and nonhomophobic.
Affirmative action is not now in vogue, if it ever was, even
though without individuals and institutions acting affirmatively,
the status quo of segregation will remain. Given the history of
exclusion of women, people of color, gays, and lesbians to which
Kay refers, affirmative action is required to overcome the effects
of that exclusion. Proponents of equality must reclaim and
relegitimate the notion of acting affirmatively to achieve "a soci-
ety where no one's social fate is determined by race, sex, class, or
other morally irrelevant factors." 18
The reality of American democracy and the institutions
within it is that social privileges are accorded based on race, sex,
class, and sexual preference and will continue to be so allocated,
unless members of society act affirmatively to change that status
17. Upon retirement Dean Vorenberg of Harvard was asked, "What has the increase
in the number of minority and women faculty done for the School?" The Dean replied:
Put in broadest terms, I think it has created a much healthier learning
atmosphere and a greater sense of fairness. Also, the rest of us can learn from our
minority and women colleagues how legal issues look to them. Questions of
affirmative action, sex and racial discrimination, and rape are raised more often
now that people on the faculty are teaching and writing in those areas. Minorities
on the faculty make it less likely that we will be timid or miss important issues.
James Vorenberg: 4 Life in the Law, 40 HARV. L. BULL., Spring 1989, at 3, 8.
Note that the discussion is framed in terms of "What do these people do for us?" The
"we" are the definition makers, the norm, while the women and minorities are the other,
the different, the disempowered. If there is an interest in changing the definitional basis of
this arrangement, it is not expressed in the articulation of why diversity matters to the
institution.
One phenomenon concerning appearance, which occurs in relation to racial minori-
ties, is represented by comments such as, "He looks more Jewish than black," or "Let's
hire an Asian who looks Asian." These comments show a misunderstanding of the reason
for diversity hiring. Members of the dominant cultural group who make such remarks are
interested in superficial appearance; they want credit for looking diversified. The need for
diversity does not stem from the goal of making the dominant culture look less dominant,
but rather from the importance of including "outsiders," even those who may not visually
look like "outsiders." It is the identification of individuals with previously disenfranchised
groups and the ability to see the world differently from the dominant cultural majority that
adds to the intellectual richness of the institution, not an individual's appearance. See
Brooks, Affirmative Action in Law Teaching, 14 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. RFv. 15 (1982)
(suggesting that the notion of qualifications should be expanded to include black teachers
who want to devote their work to problems facing the "black underclass").
18. Denvir, "Ronnie and Roberto": 4 Reply to Daniel Williams, 23 U.S.F. L. REv.
409, 412 (1989) (the omission of sexual orientation from this list is an example of how the
presumption of the dominant culture renders invisible any alternatives) (citing Unger, The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. RaV. 561, 584 (1983)).
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quo. Catharine MacKinnon has rather succinctly summarized
the majoritarian status quo, in relation to sex discrimination:
In reality... virtually every quality that distinguishes men
from women is already affirmatively compensated in this soci-
ety. Men's physiology defines most sports, their needs define
auto and health insurance coverage, their socially designed
biographies define workplace expectations and successful
career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality
in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit,
their objectification of life defines art, their military service
defines citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability
to get along with each other-their wars and rulerships-
defines history, their image defines god, and their genitals
define sex. For each of their differences from women, what
amounts to an affirmative action plan is in effect, otherwise
known as the structure and values of American society. 9
Unless the legal academy acts affirmatively to ensure our inte-
gration with all members of society, the perpetuation of the
predominantly white, male, and heterosexual status quo will be
guaranteed.20
Because hearing the different voices is a prerequisite to
understanding or accepting them, this Article seeks to tell the
stories about recruiting and retaining faculty members from
nonmajority groups as they might really occur.21 While the inci-
19. C. MACKiNNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 36 (1987) (footnote omitted).
20. David Oppenheimer has discussed the different meanings of affirmative action.
Oppenheimer, supra note 16. Proponents usually use the term to mean nondiscrimination;
opponents emphasize the quota aspect of affirmative action as excluding qualified members
of the majority group. Id. at 42. Oppenheimer points out that affirmative action also
means preference systems, self-examination plans, and outreach plans to include in the
hiring pool more members of the excluded group. Id This Article uses all these meanings
of affirmative action as implicated in the equating of affirmative action with
nondiscrimination. When one meaning is intended, it will be specifically identified.
Integration is used in an expansive sense in this Article to mean a democratic and
equal society, without the notion that one group dominates any other. See supra note 16.
Similarly, affirmative action is used to express a method by which diversity and expansive
integration could be achieved.
21. Richard Delgado recently wrote, "Everyone has been writing stories these days."
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv.
2411 (1989). Delgado points out the value of stories: "Their graphic quality can stir
imagination in ways in which more conventional discourse cannot." Id. at 2415; see also
Symposium on Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989).
One theme in many of the stories about law told by "outsiders" is that the law is
perceived as racist, sexist, and homophobic by those who are not part of the dominant
cultural majority because the status quo is racist, sexist, and homophobic and the law is
upholding that status quo. See, eg., Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
1990] 1631
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dents described are fictitious, any resemblance to real interaction
on law school faculties is quite intentional.22  This Article uses
narrative to illustrate the difficulty of ending the cycle of exclu-
sion and describes the case law that is relevant to the achieve-
ment of that goal. The narrative illustrates how far removed the
case law is from the daily reality in which the cycle of exclusion
occurs.
The obstacles encountered in moving toward diversity on
any faculty at any historic point cannot be underestimated. No
body of case law on affirmative action can change the group
dynamics, institutional and personal, that control these deci-
sions. Nonetheless, law plays an important ideological role in
our society, nurturing our aspirations toward justice. These
group dynamics are played out in' the shadow of the law and
what it teaches society about affirmative action. Leadership and
guidance from legal decisions could play an important role in
emphasizing the importance of achieving diversity, much as
Brown v. Board of Education 3 and the John Minor Wisdom
desegregation cases which followed it set a tone for working
towards integration in the '50s and '60s. However, the Supreme
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2374-80 (1989) (arguing that the
legal system's protection of racist speech legitimates racism).
Even for those who disagree and believe that the status quo is no such thing-
imperfect perhaps, but not racist, sexist, or homophobic-it would be worth listening to
and considering why these voices are all raised in the same chorus. The chorus says, "Our
reality is different from yours. Our reality shows racism and sexism and homophobia are
problems which need addressing. The challenge for jurisprudence in the '90s is to show us
that our reality matters too. Don't simply dismiss us and deny our perceptions."
22. Teaching at several law schools while those faculties have been engaged in hiring
discussions helped me to see the way in which these decisions are a part of institutionalized
dynamics and not simply quirks of isolated personalities or law schools.
To my family of colleagues at the several different schools at which I have taught, I
certainly do not intend any flashes of recognition to be taken personally. Janna Malamud
Smith, the daughter of Bernard Malamud, has described the dilemma encountered by
authors' family members whose privacy feels violated when they recognize pieces of
themselves in the work of their novelist relative. Their own feelings of violation are
compounded by the literary audience's insatiable curiosity regarding personal details of
authors' lives. She argues that this focus on "what really was" is inappropriate because the
fictional work must stand on its own. See Smith, Where Does a Writer's Family Draw the
Line?, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Nov. 5, 1989, at 1.
Because the inspiration for this Article came from the recognition that the arguments
and barriers set up against affirmative action exist institutionally within law school culture,
rather than personally as to individuals and places, I hope the Article will be read in that
same spirit, sparking an examination of that culture. However, for my colleagues who have
never voted to hire any woman or minority candidate, I hope it will make you re-examine
your own hearts.
23. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Court affirmative action decisions have not provided that ideo-
logical Support for affirmative action; rather, they have
presented a conflicting message about supporting equal opportu-
nity and ending the cycle of exclusion. The case law affirms the
notion of nondiscrimination without providing any guidance
about how to achieve that nondiscrimination by acting
affirmatively.
A Story About Tradition
"Harold, what will it take to get your vote? I know you are
a horse trader from 'way back." As Jessica asked the question
she held her breath. She knew that her colleague appreciated a
direct "cards on the table" approach to faculty politics. But
what might he ask as a quid pro quo?
"There is nothing to horse trade," Harold replied. "You
have no idea how upset I am at the prospect of losing Jared Dan-
iels as a candidate for this teaching position. You know what I
most care about is hiring the best possible candidate for this
job." Jessica only half listened as he extolled the virtues of his
candidate, who was a capable white man with a good academic
record from a local law school and who had prior teaching expe-
rience. Jessica would have been happy to have him as a col-
league; in fact she would have preferred him to several of the
men now on her faculty. However there was only one job right
now.
"At least," thought Jessica, "he is conceding there is a posi-
tion." She reflected that many of her colleagues often empha-
sized how the law school must hire good people whenever a
qualified white male candidate appeared on the horizon, but
questioned whether the school could really afford to hire anyone
when the candidate was a minority or a woman.24
Jessica had been on the faculty appointments committee for
24. In an example of life imitating art, the San Francisco Banner Daily Journal
recently reported that the Dean at University of California at Berkeley School of Law
(Boalt Hall) had told a student group pressing for minority hiring that only one half of a
faculty position was available. Later in the same year, two white candidates (one male and
one female) were offered teaching posts. The chair of the faculty appointments committee
"acknowledged that there was only one half a position open, but said the administration
had to act quickly because the two candidates were highly sought after, being among the
top prospects in the country." Hiring Sparks Boalt Hall Protest" Students Divided Over
Offer to Couple After School Denied Opening, San Francisco Banner Daily J., Jan. 25, 1990,
at 1, col. 3.
1990] 1633
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fifteen years. She, a white woman, had been hired by Holmes
College of Law, a well-known regional law school, in the early
1970s, along with a black man and an Hispanic man. They had
been the affirmative action hires. The trio all had had outstand-
ing credentials, in some cases better than those of the colleagues
they were joining. That faculty had been composed only of
white men. One woman of color, who had been hired some
years earlier, had left. Faced with the prospect of being an all-
white, male faculty, the school had realized that they should act
affirmatively and had sought female and minority colleagues.
In the years following her appointment, during the time she
served on the hiring committee, Jessica had tried to be sure that
the thirty-member faculty looked at other qualified minority and
female applicants for available teaching positions. Now fifteen
years later, there were two white women on the faculty, besides
Jessica, and one black man. The colleagues who had been hired
with her had left for other institutions; one who had remained in
teaching was at a Midwestern law school and one had become an
appellate court judge.25 In that same time period, five white men
had been hired, in addition to the two white women and one
26minority man.When Harold finished, Jessica said, "What about our need
for affirmative action?"
"Sure," replied Harold, "I can see we need more conserva-
tive Republicans on this faculty; that view is underrepresented
here."
Jessica wasn't sure what to do. She could see this would be
a losing battle. Should she try to explain to Harold that under-
representation of women and minorities on law faculties was not
the same thing as not having a Republican majority on the
faculty? Would Harold be able to see that the Republican view-
25. But see Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be Part of a
Perpetual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 799 (1988)
(describing how women faculty members disappear at a higher rate than men faculty
members).
26. See Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American
Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. RPv. 537, 538 (1988) (footnotes omitted):
In 1986-87, a typical law school faculty had thirty one members, including those
teaching in classrooms and clinics, or holding positions as head librarians or
academic deans. Of these thirty one people, twenty seven taught in classrooms,
two taught in clinics, one was dean, and one ran the library; thirty were white and
one was black, Hispanic, or other minority; twenty six were men and five were
women.
1634 [Vol. 64
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point was easily accessible to students everywhere in American
culture-in the news, on the radio? The mainstream culture was
in no danger of being underrepresented. It was the viewpoint of
those outside of that culture that was in danger of being
unheard.
As she left his office, Jessica promised Harold she would
leave him a book review by Ursula K. Le Guin and that they
could talk later.
The Majoritarian Culture
Ursula K. Le Guin has written:
We human beings long to get the world under our control
and to make other people act just like us. In the last few centu-
ries, some of us-variously described as the White Man, the
West, the Colonial Powers, Industrial Civilization, the March
of Progress-found out how to do it. The result is that now
many of us all over the world are eating hamburgers at
McDonald's. Since other results include forests destroyed for
pasture for the cattle to make the hamburgers, and oceans suf-
focated by the waste products of making plastic boxes for the
hamburgers, the success of the White Man's control of the
world is debatable; but his success in making other people act
just like him is not. No culture that has come in contact with
Western industrial culture has been unchanged by it, and most
have been assimilated or annihilated, surviving only as vestigial
variations in dress, cooking or ethics.27
This "tremendous process of acculturation"28 has affected
law school culture and legal education as well. Although only a
microcosm of the greater social issues to which Le Guin refers,
legal education has reflected the same instinct to make other
people act just like us-the us being the majoritarian dominant
culture. And we who are not part of that majority culture are
affected by the time we spend in the institution and find our-
selves playing roles that move us toward that mainstream.29
The use of the term diversity is an acknowledgment that
27. Le Guin, Feeling the Hot Breath of Civilization (Book Review), N.Y. Times, § 7
(Book Review), Oct. 29, 1989, at 11 (review of The Storyteller by Mario Vargas Llosa).
28. Id.
29. For example, no one "makes" second-year male students don coats and ties for
interview season or forces the women into navy blue suits. But year after year we see a
repetition of that phenomenon.
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there might be some real value in not simply perpetuating that
sameness of the forceful majoritarian culture. 30 Yet the power-
ful human instinct that Le Guin describes, the need to control
others and make them act "just like us," creates a felt tension
within some minds between the goal of diversity and the desira-
bility of that goal. The majoritarian pull to make others act like
us is powerful, conflicting with the goal of diversity.
Law itself mirrors the conflict between the need for uniform
treatment of like situations and the need to do justice when like
situations may not be exactly alike.31 In the arena of sex dis-
crimination jurisprudence, argument about whether men and
women should be treated alike, minimizing the significance of
reproductive differences between men and women, has stirred
debate. 2 Broad legal acceptance of the view that equality means
minimizing differences, termed the "assimilationist view,
demonstrates that even in legal arguments the urge toward uni-
formity is powerfully felt.34
The image of the melting pot is a forceful one in our cul-
ture, speaking to the powerful positive- image that assimilation
carries. The message to those outside of the mainstream domi-
30. For a discussion of these terms, see supra note 16.
31. Much interesting legal writing has tried to examine the need for the uniformity of
law and yet the acceptance of difference. See, eg., Donovau & Wildman, Is the Reasonable
Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 435 (1981) (in the context of self-defense and provocation); Littleton, Reconstructing
Sexual Equality, 75, CALIF. L. REv. 1279 (1987) (in the context of feminist jurisprudence);
Matsuda, supra note 21 (in the context of the first amendment absolute protection of free
speech); see also Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword" Justice Engendered,
101 HARv. L. REv. 10 (1987).
32. See, e.g., Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955
(1984); Littleton, supra note 31; Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: 4
Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REv. 265 (1984); Williams,
Equality's Riddle." Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985). For a criticism of the debate, see C.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 220 (1989), and Olsen, From
False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois
1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1518 (1986).
33. Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 39, 40; see also Austin, Sapphire
Boundl, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539, 574 (discussion of assimilation and black role models).
34. For example, in tort law, the reasonable man or reasonable person standard for
evaluating negligent conduct poses this same dilemma for a legal system that wishes to
establish uniformity of treatment when the social reality of litigants may be very different.
See Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 3
(1988) (questioning whether making the terminology sex neutral really takes the
maleness-the dominant cultural value--out of the standard); see also Donovan &
Wildman, supra note 31.
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nant culture is "melt in with us, be like us, or fail to do so at
your peril." Diversity is the antidote to assimilation because it
includes a celebration of differences and recognizes the contribu-
tion of all. People need to act affirmatively to tell a different
story, one that celebrates diversity and underlines that we have
not all melted together nor do we need to.
Opening the Door
Affirmative action in the United States Supreme Court has
had an uneven history. The Court has given mixed messages
about the legitimacy of acting affirmatively to achieve integra-
tion. Even before any affirmative action cases were litigated, the
judicial awareness that the issue would be coming before the
Court affected the developing jurisprudence of sex-based dis-
crimination and apparently was to be one of the reasons that sex
was never declared to be a suspect classification under equal pro-
tection doctrine.3 5
Affirmative action finally arrived at the Court for full con-
35. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court for the first time acknowledged
that treating someone differently and unfairly, so that they had less opportunity than
another citizen solely on the basis of gender, was an equal protection violation. See
generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1972).
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion), four
members of the Court voted to declare sex a suspect classification for equal protection
purposes. Sex was compared to race, the paradigmatic suspect classification:
throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in
many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.
Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their
own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to
hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children.
d at 685. Implicit in this comparison was the notion that sex-based classifications, like
race-based ones, should be strictly scrutinized for purposes of equal protection review.
Subsequently, in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), Justice Douglas, who had been
one of the four-person plurality in Frontiero, wrote the Court's opinion and backed away
from the position that sex-based classifications were suspect and should be subjected to
strict scrutiny. Rather, he concluded that the sex-based classification at stake in the case
was constitutional because it benefited widows, who had been economically disadvantaged.
Idk at 353. See Wildman, supra note 32, at 279, 282.
Justice Douglas's decision in Kahn anticipated the affirmative action issue that Doug-
las had urged the Court to address in his dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974), decided the day before Kahn. DeFunis concerned the affirmative action plan at the
University of Washington's law school. The law school divided applicants into two groups,
regular and minority admissions. An applicant's declared "'dominant' ethnic origin" was
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sideration in the Bakke case.36 When Allan Bakke filed a law-
suit to gain admission to the Medical School at the University of
California at Davis, he set the spark to a national controversy
that had been building for years.37 Bakke, a white man, had
applied for admission and had been denied twice; he believed the
reason was that Davis Medical School set aside sixteen out of
one hundred admission slots for minority candidates.
With the parties to the case limited to the white plaintiff
and the institution and with the voice of minorities, who might
have wanted to support the program, silenced,38 Bakke won at
the California Supreme Court. The lone dissenter, Justice
Mathew 0. Tobriner, wrote, "There is, indeed, a very sad irony
to the fact that the first admission program aimed at promoting
diversity ever to be struck down under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is the program most consonant with the underlying pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment."3 9 The purposes to which
Justice Tobriner referred were the eradication and remedying of
past discrimination. Interestingly the phrase "reverse discrimi-
nation," which was much used in the popular press to describe
the "sole basis upon which eligibility for the [minority admission] program was deter-
mined." Id. at 320-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Ultimately the Court did not decide the case on the merits, declaring the controversy
to be moot. Id. at 319-20 (majority opinion). But Justice Douglas wrote a long dissent
from the Court's per curiam opinion explaining his own view on the merits. Douglas
insisted that quotas or an advantage based on race would be impermissible. Douglas wrote,
"There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred." Id at 336 (Douglas,. J.,
dissenting). He also said, "A finding that the state school employed a racial classification in
selecting its students subjects it to the strictest scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 333. Douglas acknowledged that testing is culturally biased, id. at 331-32,
335, and concluded that the case should be remanded to consider "whether the established
LSAT's should be eliminated so far as racial minorities are concerned," id at 336.
36. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
37. A Nexis search of the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington
Post, the Wall Street Journal, and Time conducted November 10, 1989, revealed that just
among these five publications, more than 100 articles on the Bakke case have been printed.
Although just a sample, this search shows the size of the outpouring of feeling about the
case and how it tapped a national nerve.
38. See J. DREYFUSS & C. LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLICS OF
INEQUALITY 49 (1979); cf Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (white firefighters,
challenging the constitutionality of a consent decree governing hiring and promotion
practices in a department that had allegedly been discriminating on the basis of race, were
permitted to challenge the consent decree. Although the white firefighters had not been
parties in the original action, the Court ignored that they had had opportunity to intervene
in the original action and that their legal claims had been represented by a white firefighters
association that appeared on their behalf.).
39. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 66, 553 P.2d 1152, 1174, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680, 702 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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suits brought by white plaintiffs who felt harmed by affirmative
action efforts, implicitly recognizes this first discrimination (i.e.,
against racial minorites) that the Supreme Court has declined to
acknowledge by its ultimate refusal to accept the reality of socie-
tal discrimination as a reason for the need for affirmative
action.40
Charles Lawrence has described the arguments before the
U.S. Supreme Court as a "discussion among gentlemen. "41
Archibald Cox, a white Harvard professor, had been chosen to
represent the University of California rather than several black
attorneys whom minority groups had urged as the logical choice.
"The regents wanted to make it clear that their lawyer repre-
sented the university and higher education and not the interests
of minority groups." 42 Cox used his role as part of the educa-
tional elite to create a kinship with the justices and to argue that
the Court should trust universities to make appropriate admis-
sions decisions without Court intervention.
The opinion of the Court was divided, with Justice Lewis
Powell playing a pivotal role. Four justices, Burger, Rehnquist,
Stevens, and Stewart, interpreting the controversy narrowly,
believed that Title V143 had been violated by the University's
admission policy and that Allan Bakke should be admitted to
the medical school.44
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and White believed
that no equal protection or Title VI violation had occurred45 and
that a race-based classification would not always be per se inva-
lid.46 These Justices would prohibit a race-based classification
that was irrelevant or stigmatizing, but they did not view reme-
dying past discrimination as an irrelevant or pernicious use of
race.47 This opinion pointed out that a race-based classification
that disadvantaged whites as a group lacked the indicia of sus-
40. 438 U.S. at 310.
41. J. DREYFUSS & C. LAWRENCE III, supra note 38, at 172-202.
42. Id. at 177.
43. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982)) provides: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
44. 438 U.S. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. Id at 349 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
46. Id at 356.
47. Id. at 361-62.
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pectness associated with a classification that disadvantaged
blacks because there was no history of prior discrimination
against whites, they were not a discrete and insular minority,
race-based classifications were relevant to remedy past discrimi-
nation, and the remedy, here the Davis plan, was crafted to
avoid stigma against whites, the group Bakke alleged was hurt.48
The Brennan group, rejecting minimum scrutiny equal pro-
tection review,49 articulated a test to review race-based classifica-
tions that was based on the "middle-level scrutiny" 5 equal
protection review that had been previously articulated in sex-
based discrimination cases.5 1 First, the articulated purpose of an
allegedly remedial racial classification should be reviewed; here
the concurring Justices said that remedying the effects of past
societal discrimination was an acceptable purpose. 2 Second, the
Court should review whether the means chosen bore a substan-
tial relation to that articulated purpose.5 3 Thus the Brennan
group would ask whether the Davis Medical School special
admissions program, which set aside sixteen out of one hundred
spots for disadvantaged minorities, served an important govern-
mental objective and was substantially related to achievement of
that objective.5 4
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, was joined in part
of his opinion by both groups of Justices. He was the only Jus-
tice to subscribe to the entire opinion, and his role, weaving a
path between the disagreeing camps, enhanced his image as a
mediator and facilitator on the Court.5 In his opinion, Justice
48. Id at 374-75.
49. Id at 358-59. The Brennan opinion argued that minimum scrutiny of race-based
classifications offered inadequate protection because racial classifications were often used to
stigmatize the politically powerless, remedies could result in paternalistic stereotyping, and
race is an immutable characteristic. Id at 360-62.
50. Id at 359. Gunther observed that the Court might be putting "new bite into the
old equal protection." See Gunther, supra note 35, at 21.
51. 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Middle-level scrutiny is explained in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313, 316-17 (1977) (per curiam) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
52. 438 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
53. I.d at 359.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Powell Moderation Amid Divisions, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1987, at A32,
col. 1:
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Powell rejected the notion of benign discrimination 6 and the
notion that there are majorities and minorities. 7 He said that
strict scrutiny should apply to all racial classifications58 and that
racial classifications could not be used as a remedy in the
absence of a finding of constitutional or statutory discrimination
by the appropriate legislative, judicial, or administrative body.59
Here that meant that the University could not decide for itself
that it needed to remedy societal discrimination in its admission
policy. Justice Powell rejected several of the University's argu-
ments as to why, under strict scrutiny of the race classification,
an important government purpose was being served that war-
ranted upholding the classification including the need to remedy
the deficit of minority doctors, 60 to remedy societal discrimina-
tion,61 and to provide doctors for underserved communities.62
But Justice Powell did find that the final argument made by
the University to support its special admissions program, the
need for a diverse student body, was protected by academic free-
dom under the first amendment. He concluded that "[tihe free-
dom of a university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body. ' 63 Essentially Justice
Justice Powell was the Court's balancer and compromiser, a thoughtful
judge whose vote could rarely be taken for granted but who was widely regarded
as open to the persuasive power of any lawyer's best argument.
Asked at a news conference today to name his most important opinion,
Justice Powell replied that it was probably the Allan P. Bakke case, the 1978
ruling that invalidated a racial quota for medical school admissions but kept the
door open for affirmative action. With the Court otherwise deadlocked 4 to 4. he
wrote the key opinion that defused, at least for a time, an explosive issue.
56. 438 U.S. at 291.
57. Id at 295-97.
58. Id at 299.
59. Id at 307.
60. Id Justice Powell said that this goal was not legitimate because "[p]referring
members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination
for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids." Id
61. Id at 310. Justice Powell stated that
the purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical
School perceived as victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a
classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear
no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions
program are thought to have suffered.
Id.
62. Id Powell said that "there is virtually no evidence in the record indicating that
petitioner's special admissions program is either needed or geared to promote that goal."
Id
63. Id at 312.
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Powell was telling universities across the nation to be more like
Harvard and to use race, if at all, as just one factor in admis-
sions.6 But the significance of the message, delivered in this
guise, is that acting affirmatively is only permissible if one does
not do it too openly. Such a message legitimates the notion that
it's not quite acceptable to engage in affirmative action, adding
to the uneasiness that surrounds the ideal of diversity. And it
further suggests that there is a limit to how much affirmative
action is allowable.6 5  Finally by grounding this apologetic
endorsement of affirmative action in the first amendment princi-
ple of free speech and academic freedom, rather than in the four-
teenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws,
the Supreme Court obscured the essence of equality at stake in
the decision. Diversity, which is essential for equality, is a con-
tinuing component of democracy.
The Segregated Reality
Richard Chused reports that "[r]acial tokenism is alive and
well at American law schools. About one third of all schools..
have no black faculty members. Another third have just one." '66
Chused also documents the "failure of a sizeable segment of law
schools, including many of the highest stature, to hire substan-
64. Id at 316. That Justice Powell used the example of Harvard is telling, given that
Professor Cox argued the case. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
65. See Bell, Application of the "Tipping Point" Principle to Law Faculty Hiring
Policies, 10 NovA L.J. 319 (1986) [hereinafter Bell, Tipping Point]; Bell, The Supreme
Court 1984 Term, Foreword-The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. Rnv. 4, 39, 41-42
(1985) [hereinafter Bell, Chronicles] ("The Chronicle of the Devine Gift").
In Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L. REv.
2382 (1989), Bell uses fiction to report on the state of affirmative action at Harvard
University to dramatize the need to achieve 10% black.representation on the faculty and in
the administration. He points out that real strides in civil rights have always come out of
crisis and ponders why places cannot act without the urgency that crisis brings. Id at
2400.
Bell describes the obstacles that the deans at Harvard have perceived as keeping them
from achieving the goal of integration. Id at 2401-02. The deans do not object to
affirmative action, with which they agree in theory. Yet Harvard remains a predominantly
white institution.
Bell also includes a hate letter to show the discriminatory attitudes that underlie some
people's objection to affirmative action. Id. at 2403. The letter recites the alleged merit-
based arguments against affirmative action. Id. Bell shows how those objections are
legitimated by the failure of institutions to act affirmatively to integrate themselves. Id. at
2405.
66. Chused, supra note 26, at 539.
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tial numbers of women." 67 Chused's survey of the 1986-87 aca-
demic year showed that women composed eleven percent of
tenured classroom faculty. 8
Chused identifies two excuses offered by racially segregated
all-male faculties to justify the lack of racial and gender diversity
at their institutions: (1) qualified applicants are unavailable and
(2) a slot or position is not available. 9 Chused's study asserts
that both of these excuses are "hollow" 70 because enough facul-
ties have achieved diversity to show that there are qualified can-
didates for faculty positions and because turnover is high enough
that positions will become available. He advocates that
commitment, devotion of time, willingness to confess error,
conscious devotion to finding and using new methods for
recruiting faculty, placement of existing women and minority
faculty on hiring and tenure committees [, and] the use of sub-
stantial numbers of open faculty slots as targets for the fulfill-
ment of openly stated hiring goals 71
be substituted for these excuses as a means of achieving faculty
diversity.
But what happens when there is a position and a "qualified
applicant" who is a minority or female? Are other excuses used
to keep this person from being appointed to the job?
A Story About Progress
"You just have to be patient, Jessica," said Richard, one of
her liberal faculty colleagues. "Progress is slow at a school this
small. We've hired six women and minorities in fifteen years
and five white men. They get one spot, we get one spot. Why is
that so bad?"
"Maybe you're right in practical terms, Richard. Maybe
there is no hope we can do any better. But every one of those
slots that has gone to a woman or a minority has only led to an
appointment after a fight. Yet these people have all been well-
qualified according to the very rules establishing qualifications
67. IML at 555.
68. Id. at 557.
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that this institution has traditionally followed. Why the resist-
ance every time? What are people afraid of?"
"Do you really want me to answer that?" asked Richard.
Jessica nodded, stubbornly.
"Now, Jessica, you know the litany as well as I do," said
Richard, looking at her. "Some people are just worried that
they won't be comfortable with a minority or a woman, or they
are afraid they might be shown up intellectually, or they are
afraid the newcomer will make waves, making this a less com-
fortable place for them to be."
Jessica just shook her head. She didn't think her colleagues
were bad or evil people. She just thought they didn't want any-
one to rock the boat. She was meeting with Richard to ask for
his help concerning the position presently before the faculty.
"I'm going to try to get the faculty to hire Theresa Vallero."
Richard just looked at Jessica, shaking his head.
"What's the matter?" Jessica bristled. Theresa Vallero had
graduated Phi Beta Kappa from a prestigious national univer-
sity, Order of the Coif from a top Midwestern law school, been
an articles editor of the law review in which she had published
two student notes, clerked for a United States Circuit Court
judge, taught for three years at Jefferson, another local law
school, and had returned to the practice of law. She had better
credentials than many members of the Holmes faculty. She was
also a black-Hispanic woman.
Richard shrugged his shoulders, "It's their turn. If you try
to push for her, people will get angry and we'll be undermined
on other issues."
Jessica couldn't believe what she was hearing. "I'm going
to do this Richard. Do I have your vote?"
"I won't oppose her," said Richard. "You have my vote,
but I'm not going to help you either. I like Theresa, but the last
candidate we hired was considered one of us. Some people even
opposed his candidacy saying that because I was on the faculty,
we didn't need another person like me. It's not our turn."
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
Affirmative action litigation in the Supreme Court contin-
1644 [Vol. 64
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ued with Fullilove v. Klutznick 72 in which the Court reviewed a
congressional action appropriating money for state and local
public works projects that set aside ten percent of the funds for
minority business enterprises (MBE). This set-aside could also
be waived where "compliance with the 10% requirement proved
infeasible. ' 73  Finding that Congress, having broad remedial
powers, need not act in a wholly colorblind fashion,74 the Court
also asserted that Congress could engage in remedial action
without establishing the kind of record needed in a judicial
action.75 Because existing subcontracting practices could perpet-
uate the prevailing impaired access of minority business enter-
prises and this inequity had an effect on interstate commerce,
congressional action was appropriate.76 Declining to identify its
standard of review, the Court wrote:
Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessar-
ily receive a most searching examination .... This opinion
does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of
analysis articulated in such cases as University of California
Regents v. Bakke. However, our analysis demonstrates that the
MBE provision would survive judicial review under either
"test" articulated in the several Bakke opinions.77
And so following a most searching examination, a congressional
affirmative action plan was upheld.78
In the Title VII analogue to Bakke, United Steelworkers v.
Weber,79 the Court upheld a negotiated plan between an
employer and union that set aside fifty percent of training pro-
gram positions for minority workers until the goal of parity was
reached.80 The plan, which was designed "to break down old
72. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
73. Id at 460.
74. Id at 482.
75. Id at 490.
76. Id at 475-76.
77. Id at 491-92 (citation omitted).
78. The Supreme Court has agreed to consider two cases which implicate the
Fulliove decision. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S.
Jan. 8, 1990) (No. 89-453), and Astroline Communications v. Shurberg, cert. granted, 58
U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1990) (No. 89-700).
79. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
80. Id at 197-98. In his concurring opinion in Weber, Justice Blackmun noted that
Judge John Minor Wisdom had dissented from the Fifth Circuit decision, which the
Supreme Court reversed. 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his Weber
dissent, vindicated by the U.S. Supreme Court result, Judge Wisdom had written that
the pervasive effects of centuries of societal discrimination still haunt us. Kaiser
and the United Steelworkers sought in a reasonable manner to remedy some of
1990] 1645
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patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy,"'" legitimately
aided in the ending of racial discrimination. The plan did not
create an absolute bar to advancement for white workers82 nor
did it involve firing whites.8 3 The Court also favorably noted the
temporary nature of the plan. 4 The dissenters believed that
Title VII, aimed at combatting discrimination, forbade affirma-
tive action.
In these cases affirmative action achieved some recognition
by the Court, although not a comfortable measure of legitimacy.
The Court's ambivalence about affirmative action was further
demonstrated in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,6 in
which a union and local school board had entered into a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that apportioned layoffs between
minority and nonminority teachers to preserve the effects of the
voluntary affirmative action hiring plan. Without this agree-
ment, layoffs based on seniority would have meant that the work
force would be primarily white.8 7 White teachers who were laid
off challenged the constitutionality of the agreement, asserting
that their equal protection rights had been violated. 8
The Supreme Court plurality decision found the agreement
unconstitutional, reiterating the position that race distinctions of
any sort are inherently suspect and should be strictly scrutinized
and that the level of scrutiny does not change "merely because
the challenged classification operates against a group that histor-
ically has not been subject to governmental discrimination. "89
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, rejected the argument
that the racial classification was necessary to rectify past societal
discrimination by providing role models for minority students.90
He noted that the Court had never held that societal discrimina-
those effects in employment practices. Their actions may or may not be just to all
its employees; they may or may not be wise; but I believe they are legal.
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 239 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).




85. Id at 228 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger).
86. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
87. Id. at 270-72.
88. Id. at 272-73.
89. Id. at 273.
90. Id. at 276.
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tion alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification. 91 "Rather,
the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimina-
tion by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited
use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimina-
tion." 92 Justice Powell also questioned the sufficiency of the fit
or relationship between the governmental purpose and the
means selected to achieve that purpose, arguing that "the role
model theory does not necessarily bear a relationship to the
harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices. '93
Justice Powell also expressed concern over the burden that
a preferential layoff scheme imposed on innocent parties.94 He
noted that preferential layoff schemes were more intrusive than
hiring goals in three different respects. First, "[i]n cases involv-
ing valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by innocent indi-
viduals is diffused to a considerable extent among society
generally. Though hiring goals may burden some innocent indi-
viduals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that
layoffs impose. ' 95 Second, "'the rights and expectations sur-
rounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable
capital asset that the worker "owns" .... .' Layoffs disrupt these
settled expectations in a way that general hiring goals do not."'96
Third, "[w]hile hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often fore-
closing only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the
entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individu-
als, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives."'97
Justice Stevens's dissent emphasized the purpose of the lay-
off scheme, not as a remedy for past discrimination, but rather as
aimed at educating children for the future.98 He noted that "[i]n
this case, the collective-bargaining agreement between the Union
and the Board of Education succinctly stated a valid public pur-
pose-'recognition of the desirability of multi-ethnic representa-
tion on the teaching faculty.' "99 He argued that "a school board
may reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be able
91. Id at 274.
92. Id.
93. Id at 276.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 282 (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 283 (quoting Fallon & Weiler, Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S.
CT. REV. 1, 58).
97. Id. (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 315 (quoting Petition for Certiorari app. 22a).
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to provide benefits to the student body that could not be pro-
vided by an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty. ' ' 10°
Affirmative action was upheld in several other cases on nar-
row fact-specific grounds.10 1 In these cases the Court failed to
agree upon a standard of review for affirmative action, often
melding equal protection and Title VII theory. These cases did
not provide general principles for supporting affirmative action
in future cases; rather they were cases based either on a judicial
finding of egregious past discrimination,10 2 or on a party having
been held repeatedly in contempt of court,10 3 or on a consent
100. Id. at 315-16.
101. In Local 93, International Association of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986), decided the same term as Wygant, the Court considered a challenge to a court-
entered judgment based upon a consent decree between the city and minority firefighters
who had previously sued the city for discriminating against them in hiring, assignment, and
promotion. The decree provided that half of promotions to lieutenant be given to minority
firefighters and that for 52 promotions to higher positions, all 10 minorities who qualified
would be appointed. Id. at 510.
This decree was challenged by the union, which argued that the decree violated Title
VII because such an order could not be entered without a showing that the persons
benefitted had been discriminated against. Id. at 514. The Court affirmed the trial court's
rejection of this challenge, noting that the consent decree was essentially a contract between
the parties rather than an order by the court and that the statute encouraged rather than
discouraged voluntary resolution of these problems. Id. at 524 n.13. -
In Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986), a court-ordered union membership plan with temporary numerical quotas for
minorities was upheld against both a Title VII and equal protection clause challenge, even
though the Court acknowledged that "whites seeking admission into the union may be
denied benefits," id. at 479, and that the plan extended relief to minorities who were not
"identified victims" of the union's discrimination, id. at 445. Although failing to agree on a
standard of review, the Court found that in this case the quota was necessary because the
union's practices were persistently discriminatory and the union had repeatedly been held
in contempt of court. Id. at 476-77. The Court noted favorably the plan's temporariness
and its flexibility regarding deadlines and excuses for noncompliance. Id. at 477-79.
In another case of "egregious discrimination," United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987), a court-ordered numerical plan for promoting minority Alabama police officers was
upheld. The plan had been imposed 12 years after the trial court had first found pervasive
discrimination. The plan's requirement of one-for-one promotions could be waived if there
were no "qualified" blacks. Justice Stevens argued that the relevant guidelines for
remedying segregation had been established by the Court's unanimous opinion in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Paradise, 480 U.S. at 189
(Stevens, J., concurring).
A consent decree was not upheld in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467
U.S. 561 (1984). In Stotts, the Court invalidated an injunction that provided for a modified
layoff plan aimed at protecting black employees so as to comply with an earlier consent
decree. The decree's purpose had been to remedy the fire department's hiring and
promotion policies respecting blacks.
102. See Paradise, 480 U.S. 149.
103. See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. 421.
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decree between the parties. 1°4 The Court failed to provide posi-
tive guidance about affirmative action, and how it could be used
to achieve nondiscrimination.
A Story About Leadership
Jessica went to the Dean to make a plea for leadership from
him in the direction of affirmative action.
"You know what I think about affirmative action," said the
Dean, who had made clear in the past that he did not think
much of diversity or affirmative action.
"Did you see the President's message from Susan Prager in
the last AALS newsletter? 15 It talked about the need for legal
academicians to take affirmative action seriously-to try to inte-
grate the legal profession," Jessica began, but the Dean inter-
rupted her.
"I saw it, and if that's what she thinks, it's probably why
they have so many problems at UCLA with the bar exam. '"106
Jessica sighed. There was not much point in trying to have
a conversation with the Dean about this subject. Affirmative
action was inextricably linked in his mind with admitting or hir-
ing people with lower qualifications than should be required.
To Jessica, affirmative action meant something quite differ-
ent. She herself was an affirmative action professor-someone
who would not have become a legal educator but for the action
of Holmes College, acting affirmatively in seeking her out and
asking her to consider joining the faculty.
"No," he told Jessica. "I won't help you convince the
faculty to hire Theresa Vallero. I have a different agenda.
Besides I don't think she is very good. I was not impressed by
her faculty presentation."
104. See Paradise, 480 U.S. 149. But see Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989)
(holding that white firefighters who had failed to intervene in earlier employment
discrimination proceedings were not precluded from challenging a consent decree and
subsequent employment decisions).
105. See Prager, Prager Critiques Faculty Hiring Traditions, Stan. L.J., Apr. 3, 1987,
at 2, col. 1 (reprinted from AALS NEWSL., Nov. 1986).
106. This widely held myth is not true. UCLA students taking the California bar for
the first time in the summer of 1989 passed at a rate of 82.1%. Memorandum from
Academic Dean Daniel J. Lathrope to the faculty at Hastings College of the Law (Dec. 21,
1989) (citing "General Bar Examination Statistics, ABA Approved Law Schools in
California") (copy on file with the Tulane Law Review).
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"Why not?" asked Jessica, "I thought she was brilliant; she
had some important new ideas about equal protection theory."
"I had been looking forward to it. But she wasn't force-
ful."o7 I just don't have a very good impression of her."'' 08
Jessica thought to herself that the Dean taught bankruptcy
and corporate tax and was not very familiar with the topics
being debated in the equal protection and employment discrimi-
nation field. He could not realize the kind of contribution that
those ideas could make to that field; he also did not think that
area of law was terribly important.
"Besides," the Dean continued, "as a faculty, we have
argued and fought over affirmative action in both faculty hiring
and student admissions. We don't need another fight like that."
Jessica reflected on the debates over affirmative action that
had occurred since she had joined the law school's faculty. In
the late 1970s the Dean had tried to scrap the special admissions
program by which minority and economically disadvantaged
students had been admitted to the law school. The faculty split
down the middle, amid student demonstrations and alumni out-
cry. The program had been retained by one vote. Some mem-
bers of the faculty did not speak to each other for months after
this fight. A black woman lawyer, Josefa Jamison, was hired to
direct the academic support program for these admittees. But
her position was not as a faculty member; she did not even have
a mailbox in the faculty mail room.
The next big affirmative action fight that divided the faculty
was over minority hiring. A black male candidate was opposed
as having no prior teaching experience. An Asian male candi-
date with teaching experience was opposed as not having pro-
duced any legal scholarship. One group believed that "reasons"
were always given for dismissing qualified minority candidates.
The other group believed that curricular needs at the school
were being ignored in the search for affirmative action
professors.
107. See Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class
Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147, 149-50 (1988) (discussing how a woman's speech is
often devalued and criticized no matter how she expresses herself-she is either too loud or
too soft, too aggressive or not aggressive enough).
108. From a discrimination plaintiff's perspective, the reason a job or promotion was
denied is sex, race, or both. The employer will always assert another motive. Addressing
the problem of mixed-motive cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989),
the Supreme Court held that an employer must prove it would have made the same
decision even if gender had not been involved in the decision.
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Throughout the disagreements, affirmative action has been
the policy of the law school, but that had meant different things
to different people. "I probably couldn't get this job today," Jes-
sica reflected. "There seems to be less interest in affirmative
action now, especially for women of any race."
One Is Not Enough
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 1° 9 the United States
Supreme Court upheld against a Title VII challenge a voluntary
affirmative action plan that considered the applicant's sex as part
of the hiring decision. The case had originated when a male
employee of a county agency claimed he was passed over for
promotion because of his sex. The agency, noting that women
were underrepresented among agency employees in relation to
the county labor force, had adopted a voluntary afflrmative
action plan that allowed the agency "to consider as one factor
the sex of a qualified applicant." 110 Women's advocates hailed
the case as a great victory;"' opponents decried the decision as
anti-egalitarian, anti-merit, and pro-quotas.11 2
But the record showed that of 238 skilled craft worker posi-
tions, the job classification at issue in this case, not one of those
positions was held by a woman. On these facts it would be sex
discrimination not to hire a qualified woman for the position,11 3
providing another example of the need for affirmative action to
achieve nondiscrimination.
Seven candidates had been eligible for the job at issue in the
litigation, a road dispatcher position. Petitioner Johnson had
tied for second and Diane Joyce, the female applicant who was
promoted, had been ranked third in the promotion evalua-
tions.1 1 4 Both had been rated as "well-qualified." ' 1 5
109. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
110. Id. at 621.
111. See, ag., Feminists and Civil Rights Activists Praise Court Ruling, L.A. Times,
Mar. 26, 1987, pt. 5, at 1, col. 1.
112. Anger and Elation at Ruling on Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987,
§ 4, at 1, col. 1; see also Rights Panel Rejects Criticism of Decision, L.A. Times, May 16,
1987, pt. 1, at 17, col. 1 (discussing three members of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, all
Reagan appointees, who voted to accept a Commission staff report criticizing Johnson v.
Transportation Agency).
113. Oppenheimer, supra note 16, at 59.
114. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 623-24.
115. Id at 625. Justice O'Connor's concurrence characterized these facts as meaning
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The Supreme Court opinion by Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, upheld the
agency's affirmative action plan commenting with favor that it
involved "traditionally segregated job classification[s] in which
women have been significantly underrepresented." 16 Further-
more the plan set aside "no specific number of positions for
minorities or women." 117 The plan was temporary and would be
used to attain, not maintain, a balanced workforce.118 Male
employees had no absolute entitlement to be promoted to that
job; but the plan did not pose an absolute bar either.119 The
Court further commented on. the value of voluntary efforts to
further the objective of Title VII, which is nondiscrimination. 120
Ironically, in recognizing the "contribution that voluntary
employer action can make in eliminating the vestiges of discrimi-
nation in the workplace,"' 21 the Court was recognizing the very
legacy of societal discrimination, the ongoing presence of racism
and sexism, that the Court had declined to acknowledge in the
Bakke decision. 122
The Johnson decision itself makes a statement in favor of
affirmative action-the kind of statement that, if it had been con-
sistently developed, could have been influential in the same way
Brown v. Board of Education 123 was. But the Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence remained stuck at the tokenism level,
approving action only when faced with the "inexorable zero." 124
that female applicant Joyce was marginally less qualified for the job. Id at 675 n.5
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor may have been trying to lay to rest the
concern that affirmative action is synonymous with "unqualified." However, "less
qualified" even with the modifier "marginally" still will read "less qualified" to some
readers, perpetuating the notion that affirmative action results in the selection of
unqualified candidates. O'Connor said that had Joyce's experience been less by a larger
margin, the petitioner Johnson might have received the promotion. Id at 656.
116. Id. at 620-21 (majority opinion).
117. Id. at 622.
118. Id. at 639.
119. Id at 638.
120. Id at 640. This affirmation of voluntary, temporary action to attain a diverse
workforce should encourage similar voluntary action by the legal academy.
121. Id. at 642.
122. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing Justice Powell's refusal to
recognize remedying past societal discrimination as a justification for affirmative action).
123. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
124. This language comes from International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977), in which the Court remarked that a defendant's
inability to rebut the inference of discrimination came from the total absence of minorities
in linedriver jobs.
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A Story About First Women
Jessica telephoned Sandra, a woman colleague at a national
law school in the East. She described the hiring situation to seek
advice. "You know, not only is Theresa black and Hispanic, but
she is also so tall; she's almost six feet, you know. I think some
of the men are intimidated by how she looks. She's not unattrac-
tive, but she looks so powerful. And the combination of her size
and color is frightening to them." 125
"Have you told her to wear flats?" asked Sandra.
"You make this sound like a junior high prom," protested
Jessica.
"Well, how different is it really?" was Sandra's grim reply.
"If she were applying here, the words of the debate would focus
on her scholarship, but that's a very subjective criterion, as you
know. Certain things become fashionable and acceptable in
scholarship-civil republicanism is big now. Whatever's new or
different may be described as 'drivel.' ",126
"For a bunch of people who pride themselves on being
independent thinkers, they are incredibly conformist, aren't
they?" mused Jessica.
"Sometimes I think they are more worried about finding
someone they can have lunch with-and when lunch is at one of
their all-male clubs, it is a problem fitting us in," answered San-
dra. "I am getting sick of it, so I'm taking a position against
affirmative action at my school."
"What!" Jessica could not suppress her disbelief.
"Listen," said Sandra, cutting off the tirade she felt Jessica
was about to launch, "when I was hired I was told it was
125. Holcomb, Unattractive Need Not Apply, Sexism Among the Professors, HARPERS,
July 1986, at 73 (describing a faculty interview of Dr. Monroe, Marilyn Monroe's double,
dooming future candidates who did not fit the mold); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 317 n.44 (1987) (discussing physical appearance and its impact on juries and
suggesting that "physically attractive defendants receive greater leniency in sentencing than
unattractive defendants").
126. See, eg., Head of Harvard Says No to Teacher's Tenure, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11,
1988, at A15, col. 1:
Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, refused today [March 10, 1988]
to grant tenure to an assistant law professor associated with an ideology
challenging the traditional view of the law.
The assistant professor, Clare Dalton, has contended that the Harvard Law
School faculty voted last June to deny her tenure because of her politics and her
gender. She adheres to the view that the law is not founded on neutral principles
ofjustice but is. instead an expression of an oppressive social and economic status
quo.
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because I was a woman. Now ten years later, after tenure, pub-
lishing two books and ten articles, I'm still told that I'm only
here because I'm a woman. 127 I don't think we should bring
women in if they are just going to be perceived of as less quali-
fied. We need to hire women and minorities as regular faculty
members."
A Story About the Right Woman
Jessica sought refuge by going to talk to Danielle, the third
woman who had been hired at Holmes. She was an allied spirit.
"You notice these places are never named Thurgood Marshall
College of Law or Myra Bradwell Law School," Jessica grum-
bled in frustration.
"Well,' they're not revered the way Holmes was," answered
Danielle simply.
"But that's just the point," answered Jessica. "That's like
saying, 'Why aren't there any great women painters or writers?'
Sexism is real. Those who are designated as stars are so desig-
nated by a culture which is predisposed to see certain qualities as
important-a certain vision, a certain viewpoint-and is turned
off by others. 128
"And don't forget," Jessica continued, "what happened to
Kirsten. She had been an outstanding Ph.D. student in philoso-
phy, before getting her law degree. When she went to interview
with a national law school, the faculty member who interviewed
her said, 'We only hire from the old boy network.' Kirsten had
known that, since she had gotten the interview because one of
the 'old boys,' who had been her dissertation advisor, had called
and had recommended that she be considered. Even coming
through the old boy network, the interviewers didn't take her
seriously, at a time when that school had only three women
faculty members out of sixty."
"Well, it's true even stars have trouble finding faculty posi-
tions, but Kitty MacKinnon has finally been offered a tenured,
full professorship," 12 9 Danielle offered. "Doesn't that make you
127. On proving one's self over and over, see Bell, Tipping Point, supra note 65, at
320, and Angel, supra note 25, at 830-34.
128. The experience of employment discrimination litigants illustrates this point.
See, eg., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 624 n.5 (1987) (One of the male
employees in her department referred to Diane Joyce as a "skirt-wearing person.").
129. See Job Offer to Feminist Scholar May Mark Turn, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1989, at
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feel encouraged about the prospects of women law professors?"
Danielle continued, "The reluctance to hire Theresa here is
not just about discrimination against women. If Jared Daniels
were a white woman, politically conservative, our colleague Har-
old would support her, too."
"So is the problem simply racism?" queried Jessica.
Danielle thought and slowly said, "No, I think it's more
complicated-racism and sexism harm women of color more
than the sum of the two--or maybe it's racism combined with
fear of the F-word, you know, feminism. 130 That's probably why
our colleague Gladys likes Jared too. No one could accuse her
of being woman-identified. But for Harold, having a conserva-
tive woman candidate would be just a convenient excuse,
because he would hope others wouldn't support her and then we
would have a standoff and hire no one. That's probably what he
really wants. He just doesn't want anyone who will disturb the
status quo."
"Well now I'm really depressed," said Jessica.
"Sorry," said Danielle.
"Well," said Jessica, "At least there's two of us here to talk
to. But it is amazing that we got here. It's like two or three is
enough for them. Any more of us would be too scary. '"131
"A Very Sad Irony, " Still
In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,1 32 Justice O'Connor
B5, col. 3 (describing the University of Michigan Law School's tenure offer to Professor
Catharine MacKinnon, who had been a visiting professor at many schools, but not offered
a permanent position); see also Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style (Book Review), 89
COLuM. L. REv. 1147, 1149 n. 14 (1989) (describing the relationship of hiring decisions and
scholarship as follows: "As long as an outstanding legal scholar like MacKinnon was not
given a tenured teaching post in the United States, feminist scholarship remained
vulnerable within legal academia.").
130. See, eg., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1783 (1989) (trial judge
had found that to be identified as a "woman's libber" in evaluation by colleagues was
regarded as a negative comment) (citing Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109,
1117 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd,
109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989)); see also Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Dunlap, The "F" Word: Mainstreaming
and Marginalizing Feminism, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 251 (1989-1990); Harris, Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
131. See Bell, supra note 65, at 123.
132. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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framed the issue before the Court as resolving the tension
between the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal treatment
for all citizens and the use of race-based measures to ameliorate
the effects of past discrimination. 133 To members of non-privi-
leged societal groups, the use of such measures does not create
tension. It is truly "a very sad irony" if race-based measures to
ameliorate past discriminatory effects might be found unconsti-
tutional. 134 Society cannot ever break free of the segregated pat-
terns into which discrimination has placed us, unless it is by
consciously acting. And thus by framing the issue in this way,
the opinion identifies itself with the perspective of the perpetra-
tors of that societal discrimination and the maintenance of the
status quo.135
The City of Richmond had enacted a thirty-percent set
aside in -construction contracts for minority business enter-
prises. 36 Proponents of the set aside had relied on a study that
showed "while the general population of Richmond was 50%
black, only .67% [less than 1%] of the city's prime construction
contracts had been awarded to minority businesses" 137 during
the relevant period. Nonetheless the Court held that this set
aside could not withstand equal protection scrutiny, noting
"[t]here was'no direct evidence of race discrimination on the
part of the city in letting contracts or any evidence that the city's
prime contractors had discriminated against minority-owned
subcontractors." 138
The opinion distinguished Fullilove, which had upheld a ten
percent minority set aside, based on the flexible nature of the ten
percent set aside and on the special power of Congress which,
unlike any state or political subdivision, could enforce the dic-
133. Id. at 712.
134. See Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 66, 553 P.2d 1152, 1174,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 702 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
135. See Freeman, supra note 8, at 1052-57 (discussing the perpetrator perspective as
compared to the victim perspective). One problem with this terminology, although making
an enormous contribution to the field of equal protection jurisprudence, is that the notion
of "victim" of discrimination connotes a passivity on the part of the sufferers, outside the
mainstream of majority culture, when they are actively seeking to change the status quo.
The term "perpetrator" is not precise either because many individuals and institutions
unconsciously perpetuate the discriminatory status quo. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
136. 109 S. Ct. at 712-13.
137. Id at 714.
138. Id
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tates of the fourteenth amendment: 139  "That Congress may
identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination
does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political sub-
divisions are free to decide that such remedies are appropri-
ate."'14 This reasoning presents an interesting twist on the
notion of federalism, and the states' rights notions implicit in
that philosophy, saying in effect that Congress has power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection
of the laws, but that states do not. Under federalism it is the
federal government that is supposed to have limited power,
while state governments have full police power.
The decision applies strict scrutiny for the first time to an
affirmative action set-aside program. Historically, the strict
scrutiny standard had been reserved for cases of invidious dis-
crimination. Some members of the Court had urged that a lesser
standard of review would be more appropriate when the classifi-
cation was benign. 141  Justice O'Connor replied to that
suggestion:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for
such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determin-
ing what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose
of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.142
This statement is true if the mere recitation of a benign or com-
pensatory purpose for the use of a racial classification would
insulate that classification from judicial scrutiny. Theoretically,
even a benign classification could be strictly scrutinized and then
upheld if found to serve a remedial purpose. Strict scrutiny of
affirmative action plans in the future could result in their being
upheld when they are designed to achieve diversity. But scru-
tiny that has been strict in name has most often been fatal in
139. d at 719.
140. Id
141. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Brennan group in
Bakke).
142. 109 S. Ct. at 721; see Wiesenfeld v. Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) ("But
the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.").
The Wiesenfeld Court meant that any alleged benign compensatory purpose might still be
judicially reviewed.
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fact. 143
The Croson decision shows the danger inherent in the
Bakke 144 reasoning. In Bakke Justice Powell upheld the Davis
admission plan without acknowledging as a justification either
the need to increase the number of minority doctors or to
counter the effects of societal discrimination. The Court in
Croson took the Bakke result out of context, one more step away
from these justifications for affirmative action. The Court
demonstrated a failure to appreciate the kind of judicial compro-
mise Powell had engineered in that case, that affirmative action
is acceptable if the institution "Harvardizes." This use of Bakke
in Croson also shows the failure of that compromise as a true
compromise because if remedying past discrimination is not a
justification for race-and sex-based classifications, then society is
back to the " very sad irony" problem. The status quo that priv-
ileges certain groups over others cannot be changed, except self-
consciously.
I The Croson Court also discussed how Wygant,145 in which a
plurality applied strict scrutiny to a race-based system of
employee layoffs, "again drew the distinction between 'societal
discrimination' which is an inadequate basis for race-conscious
classifications, and the type of identified discrimination that can
support and define the scope of race-based relief." '146 This
emphasis on identified discrimination, matching a victim and a
perpetrator, defines the problem in a way in which it cannot be
solved. 147 Discrimination is more subtle and not susceptible to
being "identified" for purposes of judicial review within this
framework. Unconscious discrimination, particularly, is not
susceptible to the victim versus perpetrator analysis. 148
Seeking to appear judicious and interested in ending dis-
crimination, the Croson majority noted that "[n]othing we say
today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to rec-
tify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdic-
tion." 149 But to the extent that discrimination both past and
continuing occurs on a spectrum of human interaction and is
143. See Gunther, supra note 35, at 8.
144. See supra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
146. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723:
147. See Freeman, supra note 8, at 1049-57.
-148. See generally Lawrence, supra note 135.
149. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 729.
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institutionalized and unidentified by the automatic reactions that
people have to situations, the failure to act affirmatively to bring
these patterns to a conscious level will result in the old patterns
being replicated. This kind of decisional law has little effect on
the one-on-one kind of conversations that have everything to do
with whether a woman, person of color, gay, or lesbian will be
hired for a position.
Acting Affirmatively
We cannot ensure that our institutions reflect the ideals of
equality, fairness, and equal opportunity which are part of our
culture without affirmative action. Law professors are not
unique in this society in holding divergent views about affirma-
tive action. Law schools, as institutions composed of the indi-
viduals within them, are also not unique in society, as places
where the dominant cultural majority remains controlling. Law
schools, like other societal institutions, are composed of well-
intentioned individuals, who, for the most part, genuinely want
to be free of discriminatory attitudes.15 0 But as Charles Law-
rence has pointed out in the area of unconscious racism, and his
thesis holds for unconscious sexism or heterosexism as well,
many acts done with the best intentions are still racist, sexist, or
heterosexist not because the actor is a bad person, but because
we are products of the society in which we live. 5 ' Thus, the
cycle of exclusion is unwittingly continued.
Four objections are usually made to affirmative action: (1) it
violates the democratic ideal that mandates disregard of color,
sex, or sexual orientation; (2) it undermines merit-based selec-
tion; (3) it is unfair to those who have not discriminated; and (4)
it stigmatizes those it purports to assist. Each argument fails as
a reason not to act affirmatively.
Considering first the notion of disregarding race or sex in
admissions or hiring, 152 opponents of affirmative action often
150. See generally Lawrence, supra note 135.
151. Id
152. The debate about hiring without regard to sexual preference is just beginning.
Sexual orientation differs from race and sex in that it is an invisible characteristic. In a
sense, everyone can "pass" as part of the heterosexual dominant majority. Privacy as to
sexual orientation is an important consideration for many individuals as well. However,
the concern for privacy is inextricably related to the deeply felt vulnerability associated
with freely voicing sexual preference. The dominant culture poses heterosexuality as
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argue that attention to the race or sex of an applicant reduces an
individual to a single attribute, skin color, or sex, and that this
process is the antithesis of equal opportunity. This argument is
often voiced as, "I don't care if she's blue or green and from
Mars, as long as she is competent." The point that is being
made is that race or sex is irrelevant or should be.
One could imagine a society in which race and sex are irrel-
evant. In such a society we might or might not remember the
race or sex of those we meet. But, as Richard Wasserstrom has
pointed out, that imagined culture is not this culture.153 To say
that today's world functions that way is to deny reality.15 4
The race-and-sex-are-irrelevant argument is attractive
because its proponents advance it as if it were not an ideal, but
reality. We are asked to believe that the discrimination-free
society is here and that to pay attention to race or sex would be
to turn back the clock to the days before racism and sexism were
eliminated. One begins the argument with a false but attractive
premise, that the nondiscriminatory future is now and that
except for the occasional aberrant bigot or sexist, we live in a
race- and sex-neutral society.
A moment's reflection makes it clear that we do not live in
such a world. When a baby is born, the first thing most people
ask is "Is it a boy or a girl?" We do not know how to relate to
someone until we give that person a gender.'55
The second argument made against affirmative action is
related to the myth of meritocracy and the fear that affirmative
compulsory, rather than as a choice. See Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian
Existence, 5 SIGNS: J. WOMEN & CULTURE Soc'y 631 (1980); see supra note 13
(discussing the AALS compromise on these issues).
153. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1977). But see Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A
Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLM. L. REv. -1118 (1986).
Finley criticizes Wasserstrom's idea that race or sex should be as socially insignificant as
eye color. Finley states, "I sense that we will have lost something very fundamentally
human in such a world of no 'real' difference." Id at 1139.154. When someone asks you about this Article and what I wrote, you may or may
not remember, but you will remember that a woman wrote these things. And if it is not
evident from the prose, I am a white woman. And I have brown eyes. See also Cain,
Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Difference and Exploring
Connections, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 165 (1988) (describing a classroom exercise in which
students, asked to describe themselves, do not think to name their dominant group
characteristic-white, male, or straight-because it is so "naturally" part of who they are).
In contrast nondominant group characteristics are named by participants. Id at 171.
155. See M. FRYE, THE POLITICS oF REALITY 19-34 (1983) (describing the cultural
impetus for sex identification).
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action will result in a lowering of so-called "standards."
According to this argument, finding qualified women or minori-
ties is difficult or impossible, and standards must be main-
tained.156 To the extent that affirmative action retains the
meaning of giving special treatment on account of race or sex,
being against affirmative action is powerfully ingrained in the
mainstream of our culture. None of us want that special treat-
ment; we want to be judged on our so-called "merit."
Consider this riddle:
A father and his son were driving to a ball game when
their car stalled on the railroad tracks. In the distance a train
whistle blew a warning. Frantically, the father tried to start
the engine, but in his panic, he couldn't turn the key, and the
car was hit by the oncoming train. An ambulance sped to the
scene and picked them up. On the way to the hospital, the
father died. The son was still alive, but his condition was very
serious, and he needed immediate surgery. The moment they
arrived at the hospital, he was wheeled into an emergency oper-
ating room, and the surgeon came in expecting a routine case.
However, on seeing the boy, the surgeon blanched and mut-
tered, "I can't operate on this boy-he's my son."
How could it be?1 57The answer is that the surgeon is the
boy's mother. Although this is an obvious answer once the lis-
tener thinks about it, the point is that most people do not think
about it or else they solve the riddle only after careful thinking.
Most people's instantaneous reaction is to picture the surgeon as
male.15 8
This riddle reveals societal default assumptions, uncon-
scious assumptions that the mind makes and that channel
thoughts. 5 9 These assumptions are made automatically, not as
a result of consideration and thinking. Members of this culture
have trouble at a gut level seeing women and minority group
members as surgeons, lawyers, senior vice-presidents, and law
professors. The images that society associates with these words
are male and white. Intellectual knowledge-knowing that
156. The lack of qualifications argument is not voiced as often in reference to gay and
lesbian people, perhaps because the debate is still focusing on whether affirmative action
should apply to them. See supra note 152.
157. Cole, The Psychology of Affirmative Action, EXPLORATORIUM Q., Spring 1986,
at 9, 10 (excerpted from NEWSDAY MAG., July 28, 1985) (quoting Hofstadter, Default




HeinOnline  -- 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1661 1989-1990
TULANE LAW REVIEW
women and people of color can be surgeons-doesn't help listen-
ers solve the riddle because the mind makes the culturally accus-
tomed leaps without going through a rational thought process.1 60
Present definitions of merit are context-based. 161 People's expe-
rience must change in order to modify their default assumptions.
Only when default assumptions about what is possible are trans-
formed can we really unravel what is merit.
As to the unfairness affirmative action perpetuates towards
those who did not discriminate, consider that we as a society pay
for much that we did not personally do. Congress assisted
Chrysler, even though all citizens did not mismanage the com-
pany. 162 The societal good of inclusion of all its members is
most pressing and warrants societal prioritization.
As for stigma, the stigma of being a woman or minority law
professor comes from society's default assumptions, the precon-
ceptions that a woman in front of the room doesn't look like
Professor Kingsfield in The Paper Chase,163 and not from the
existence of affirmative action. Affirmative action should be
viewed in a positive light.
A Story About Exclusion
Jessica went to the meeting of her local feminist critical
legal theory group. 164 The women were from a range of law
160. Several anecdotal examples of default assumptions in action illustrates this
principle. In a final exam in which I designated an elementary school teacher character as
male, 50% of the class referred to the teacher as "she." On a different exam, with a
different class, when I designated a basketball coach for a girls' team as female, 40% of the
students referred to the coach as "he." Under the pressure of exam writing, students
responded using their default assumptions.
Recently my son came home from nursery school and said, "Mommy, the Rabbi came
to Shabbat today and told a story." A Rabbi's visit was an unusual event-a first. I
replied, "Was he good?" My son looked at me with a puzzled expression and said, "It was
a woman." Default assumptions are powerful. They show that these issues do not create a
we/they dichotomy from which any are exempt.
161. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
162. Bernstein, National Industrial Policy Debate Goes On, L.A. Times, June 12,
1985, pt. 4, at 1, col. 1 (discussing how Chrysler was saved from bankruptcy in 1980 by
government-guaranteed loans). Similarly farm subsidies and oil depletion allowances are
regular congressional actions although citizens did not cause crops to fail or fuel oil
remains to be finite.
163. See generally J. OSBORN, THE PAPER CHASE (1978).
164. See generally Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies,
and Legal Education or "The Fern Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988);
see also Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REv. 617 (1990) (to be published in
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schools. Yvonne was one of two tenured women at a nationally
known state law school. She had been one of the first women
law professors hired nationally. Constance had been the first
woman hired at her nationally known private law school. She
had two tenured female colleagues. One of them, Virginia, was
also present. Jessica and her colleague Danielle, from Holmes,
were part of the group, as were Rita, Sheryl, and Ali who all
taught at regionally known state law schools. Sheryl was a black
woman who spoke infrequently in group meetings; she did not
have tenure. She was the only woman of color in the group.
Rita was an "out" lesbian, who had recently entered law teach-
ing from a successful civil rights practice.
"Eight of us, from five different law schools-it's really
appalling-there are ten women on the UCLA faculty alone,
and they have a woman dean," said Jessica.
"Well, Jessica, that's not really a fair way to count,"
responded Virginia. "After all, all of us have at least one woman
colleague who is not here. Not all women law professors are
interested in feminist legal theory, just because they are
women."
"I know that," replied Jessica, with an edge of annoyance in
her voice. "But we don't all have nine female colleagues who
aren't here. That's my point. It is remarkable," she mused,
"that we have all made it this far in legal academia."
Ali, in whose house they were sitting, asked Danielle, "So
how is it going with Theresa? Might you get her?"
"Jessica knows more about that than I do," Danielle
replied. "I've been on leave, so I'm not involved in the politics."
Ali turned to Jessica. "So, how does it look?" Ali was
interested in hiring and tenure decisions because during her own
tenure case, some faculty had objected to her work in feminist
jurisprudence. They had told her critically that her work did
not help them understand or deal with the women in their own
lives, as if making their lives more comfortable were the goal of
feminist jurisprudence.
Jessica said, "You know how it is, there's always a reason
that the person isn't good enough. Theresa has all the paper
credentials that they ever asked for. But so did our last minority
candidate. When we pointed out he met all their previously
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY (J. Stick ed. [forthcoming]) (describing the evolution of feminist
critical legal theory)).
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articulated qualifications, then they said he needed to have pub-
lished. Then he did publish, and then they said he needed prior
teaching experience. Well, Theresa has met all those conditions,
although her publications were both done when she was a
student."
"So what's the problem?" asked Constance.
"Now they're saying there is no position-that we can't
afford another position. But you don't have that issue at your
school. I heard you have lots of positions. How is your hiring
going?"
"Well I'd like to see us make an offer to Rochelle Adams.
She's a fabulous teacher in a business field, where they're always
moaning that it's hard to find women. But now they're making
an issue of her writing, even though the high quality of her pub-
lications was originally the reason she was offered the visit."
"That's used a lot," said Yvonne. "Did you hear what hap-
pened to Belinda Fielding? Do you know her? She has been in
teaching for over fifteen years. She's published lots of articles
and a casebook. She's a frequent speaker at AALS panels. 165
When she visited at another school in her state university sys-
tem, the Dean told her the visit had been very successful, but
that when her writing had been read in the past, people hadn't
liked it."
"Well Robert Davis was told the same thing, after he vis-
ited at Harvard and Yale-that he was a great teacher, but he
hadn't written 'the kind of article' that would show he was of the
caliber to be at that school," offered Constance.
"Are you saying this is not discrimination, because it hap-
pens to men, too? Robert is black you know," interjected
Sheryl.
"No, I know another yardstick seems to be used when
women or people of color are measured. But this process-
whether hiring or tenure-doesn't seem pleasurable for our
white, male colleagues who are subjected to it, either. 166 It's not
165. The AALS, the Association of American Law Schools, is an organization of and
accrediting agency for law schools. Law faculty join its sections in areas of special interest.
These sections meet annually and present panels. The AALS also sponsors special
workshops on legal education issues throughout the year.
166. See Shapo, Propositions of Opposition: A Guide for Faculty Members Engaged in
the Assessment of Prospective and Present Colleagues, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 364 (1987)
(cataloguing the pro and con arguments that are inevitably voiced in hiring debates at
faculty meetings).
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nurturing, supportive, or a piece of cake for them," Constance
replied.
"I can see that, but they still overwhelmingly have the jobs,
while women and people of color do not. Look around you-
you see bright young white men being hired regularly. But we
still have to fight over entry level positions for young women or
minority candidates, and even for lateral hires, for that matter.
In fact, I think there may be even greater resistance to lateral
hires. And we're being denied tenure at a higher rate, too.167
The point is that any hire outside the white, male norm is still
controversial, subjected to greater scrutiny, and plain doesn't
happen without a lot of pushing within the institutionalized
framework,"' 168 Ali declared.
Jessica said, "That's the problem with discrimination. It's
lose-lose. If you've published a lot, then you're over the hill and
don't have anything good left. If you haven't published, then it's
not acceptable because you haven't shown you can produce the
'kind of article' which is valued by that institution. It's another
way of saying the candidate doesn't have 'the right stuff.'
There's always a reason, by which I mean no real reason at
all." 1
69
"That happened to a friend of mine," offered Virginia.
"She was asked to visit at a school on the strength of her writing.
The school had a policy of not considering visitors for perma-
nent appointments, which they decided to waive in her case.
Then they decided her writing wasn't good enough to earn her
the appointment."
"That doesn't even make any sense," said Danielle.
"I forgot to say that between the beginning and end of the
process, the school had hired two other women."
167. See Angel, supra note 25, at 805 (citing statistics that 31% of women reviewed
received tenure compared to 60% of men). For a discussion of how qualified feminist legal
scholars "have been denied tenure at a startling rate," see Olsen, supra note 129, at 1149
n.14.
Many issues faced by women seeking tenure begin at the point of their being hired as
members of law faculties and the perceptions surrounding atffrmative action as it is applied
to women candidates. And because some hiring offers are tenured offers, the connection
between hiring and tenure may be explicit.
168. See, eg., Angel, supra note 25; Bell, Chronicles, supra note 65, at 123; Chused,
supra note 26.
169. See M. FRYE, supra note 155, at 7 (describing discrimination as a birdcage,
when, looking out, it is hard to see the bars).
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"Three's dangerous, fight?" Danielle laughed, shaking her
head incredulously.
"Have you been following the recent discrimination case at
Boalt Hall?" asked Rita. "Eleanor Swift, who was denied ten-
ure, filed a grievance, claiming sex discrimination. Marge
Schultz was given tenure, years after it had been denied to her,
after Eleanor filed discrimination charges,1 70 and students have
been sitting-in in the Dean's office and getting arrested. I think
they are called the Coalition for a Diversified Faculty. ' 171
"Do they make house calls?" asked Danielle.
"Now there would be a thriving business-there's a lot of
need," said Virginia.
Sheryl burst out, "I'm sick of this, story after story of exclu-
sion. We as a group do the same thing you're accusing them of.
Just look at the dynamics here. This group is dominated by
women from the 'fanciest' law schools, all of whom happen to be
white."
The group fell quiet in an uncomfortable silence, which
seemed to be an acknowledgment that Sheryl was right.
Finally Yvonne spoke, "Until law schools are more diverse,
how can a group of women law professors have more minority
members? We operate in the existing law school cultural con-
text. It's hard to change the values in that culture and the way it
offers its rewards."
"But isn't that what we are asking them to do?" asked
Sheryl quietly. Again the silence suggested agreement.
"But aren't we different?" ventured Ali. "At least we are
open to talking about it."
"That's a small difference. Talk is cheap," was Sheryl's
reply.
"What are you talking about?-we would hire women and
minority law professors," Virginia sounded exasperated.
170. Bitter Tenure Battle Is Won as Panel Decides to Appoint Swift, Nat'l L.J., Sept.
18, 1989, at 4, col. 3; see also Boalt Hall Update, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 21, 1988, at 4, col. 4:
Tenured faculty at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law
(Boalt Hall) have voted to recommend tenure for Marjorie M. Schultz, who was
denied tenure in 1985. The unusual decision closely follows charges by Boalt
faculty member Eleanor Swift that her 1987 tenure denial was due to gender
discrimination.
171. The Berkeley Coalition was honored by the Society of American Law Teachers
(SALT) at a panel discussion, "Lessons Our Students Teach Us About Diversity:
Berkeley's Coalition for a Diversified Faculty," presented at the 1990 AALS annual
meeting in San Francisco.
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"But which ones? This group reflects the same elitism,
racism, and heterosexism that is part of the legal education hier-
archy. Sexism just recedes in importance here because we are all
women," answered Sheryl.
"I don't understand. We value you as part of the group,"
Constance reassured her.
"And the professorial majority would say they don't dis-
criminate either. I'm not talking about conscious desire on your
part-or on most of theirs. But it will take more than just good
intentions to change things-that's what we always tell them,"
Sheryl replied.
"I still don't understand," said Virginia. "Is this the battle
over what 'qualified' means?-the problem of what is merit?
How do you evaluate what is good work or what is good poten-
tial in a faculty colleague?"' 172
Rita said, "Let me tell you a story. A friend of mine was at
a faculty meeting where the group discussed writing letters of
condolence to the families of two city officials who had been
slain. One of the officials was gay.
"The faculty at this meeting voted to send a letter of conso-
lation to the widow of the straight official, but not to the lover of
the deceased gay man. A discussion took place at the meeting
about why it made sense to make this distinction because the
straight man had been an alumnus of the law school, while the
gay official was not a lawyer. There were some 'jokes' about
what kind of family this gay politician had. The faculty minutes
about the meeting made no mention of the discussion, even
though a motion had been made and seconded to send a letter to
the gay man's family. Three lines in the minutes had been
whited out before they were circulated for faculty approval.
"This is how it is: the discussion exists on one level with
words about it in apparently neutral language. This is the text.
But there is really something else going on. There exists a whole
level, beyond the words, where people make decisions and take
actions of exclusion. That is the sub-text, and it is never talked
about.173 If it becomes visible, it is made invisible-here by
172. See Brooks, supra note 17 (suggesting that the notion of qualifications should be
expanded to include black teachers who want to devote their work to problems facing the
"black underclass"); see also Shapo, supra note 166.
173. See Weyrauch, The "Basic Law" or "Constitution" of a Small Group, 27(2) J.
Soc. ISSUES 49, 53, 59 (1971) [hereinafter Weyrauch, Basic Law] (finding that "rules [of a
group] are not to be articulated"), reprinted in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN
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white out. That's true in this group."
"And it's true," said Jessica, "with my efforts to hire The-
resa Vallero."
Unwritten Rules
Walter 0. Weyrauch has described law as a network of
small-group interactions in which basic characteristics of legal
systems govern the interactions of individuals within small
groups. 174 Just as law is a linking together of social group inter-
action, each small group has its own operating principles and
generates, through its own group dynamics, proper rules of
behavior for members of the group. Weyrauch studied the inter-
action of nine men, who participated in a three-month nutrition
experiment, isolated in a Berkeley penthouse. 17  He observed
normative behavior that he described as the basic law or consti-
tutional document of the group. This behavioral constitution
expressed "some form of understanding based on shared
ideals." 176
The foremost canon of a group's dynamic is that the "rules
are not to be articulated."' 177 This rule, that the group not iden-
tify and articulate its own rules, occurs on law faculties, as well
as in experimental groups. 178 Although. Weyrauch's work has
been criticized for focusing on the group's own rule system,
"rather than on ascertaining internal effects of external rules," 179
his study showed that the external social realities of racism and
SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES, ch. 4, at 41, 43, 46 (1977). David A.
Funk commented on this finding:
I frequently observe this rule operating at this law school. We do certain things
in fact, though we sometimes do not want to admit it. If someone identifies and
articulates what we really do, the group may change its actions. Our prior rule of
behavior has changed because we cannot face its articulation.
Weyrauch, The Family as a Small Group, in GROUP DYNAMIC LAW: ExposrrION AND
PRACTICE 178 (D. Funk ed. 1988) [hereinafter Weyrauch, Family] (comments of Funk).
174. Weyrauch, Basic Law, supra note 173.
175. Id.; see also Weyrauch, Law in Isolation-the Penthouse Astronauts, TRANS-
ACTION, June 1968, 39 (discussing this experiment).
176. Weyrauch, Basic Law, supra note 173, at 52.
177. It at 53, 59; see also supra note 173 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Weyrauch, Basic Law, supra note 173, at 53 ("Mhe basic norm that
rules are not to be articulated... has been observed in ... law faculties."); see also
Weyrauch, Family, supra note 173, at 178 (comments of Funk).
179. D. FUNK, GROUP DYNAMIC LAW: INTEGRATING CONSTITUTIVE CONTRACT
INSTITUTIONS 86 (1982) (The word integrating in the title is used in the sense of
"producing an integrated, cohesive group," see id. at 115, not in the sense of diversification
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sexism affected the rules of the group. Weyrauch found ethnic
prejudices within the context of group dynamics, even among a
group professing to be "highly liberal about civil rights."18 0
Describing some of the laws of this penthouse group,
Weyrauch observed: "Equality of all persons is espoused, but
women are not really treated as equal (rules 5181 and 7182); racial
and religious discriminations are outlawed, but if they occur the
fact of their existence is to be denied (rule 9183). ' ' 184 The rules to
which the above passage refers are rules of the particular group
Professor Weyrauch studied, not necessarily rules of all small
groups. Nonetheless, entering and advancing in academia
requires an ability to know the "rules of the game," as has been
observed: "All institutions operate through a set of formal and
informal rules. [T]he rules for entry into the profession are
fairly straightforward .... The rules for employment and pro-
fessional advancement, however, are harder to define, varying
with the kind of institution, the region, and the times."18 5 The
same can be said about law, since to become a lawyer and to
of the group which is the concern of this article.); see also id. at 497-502 (discussing group
dynamic law relating to educational institutions).
180. Weyrauch, supra note 175, at 46.
181. "5. Competition is to be discouraged because it distracts from values of higher
order, such as human affection. Competition is particularly harmful when women
participate." Weyraueh, Basic Law, supra note 173, at 59.
182. "7. Women, if present, are to be treated with chivalry. Derogatory or obscene
remarks can be made about them if they are absent. Obscene language is excusable if used
as some form of relief in a stressful situation." Id. Such rules seem to operate in law
faculties as well as for penthouse astronauts. One woman on a faculty appointments
committee tells of the comment by a male faculty member made to a male committee
member, in her presence, concerning the length of orgasms of a female applicant. The
criticism was made that they were probably short. The female colleague was being viewed
as one of the boys because the comment was made in her presence. To function as part of
the collegial group she was faced with denying part of herself to keep that membership or
declaring them wrong to have included her.
183. All persons are born equal. If discrimination because of race or religion
occurs, the fact of discrimination is to be denied. All members of the group are
viewed as equal as a matter of principle. A person may be treated differently from
others on the basis of his [sic] merits or demerits.
Id. at 60.
184. Ia at 53-54.
185. N. AISENBERG & M. HARRINGTON, WOMEN OF ACADEME, OUTSIDERS IN THE
SACRED GROVE 41 (1988). The authors continue:
Further in all places and times, there are rules emanating from a variety of
sources-some decreed by tradition, others by the governing instruments of
particular colleges and universities, still others by union contracts that have
replaced the older system of professional norms promulgated as desirable
standards by the American Association of University Professors.
Id. The authors go on to describe government policies affecting higher education.
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enter the profession, one must pass a bar exam; but to become a
law professor, the institution, region, and times affect the
"qualifications."
This work on small-group dynamics has important ramifi-
cations for hiring decisions generally and for law school hiring in
particular. The dynamics of sexism, racism, and homophobia,
which are social realities in 1990 America,18 6 interface with the
rules of each faculty group as the hiring decision is made. These
decisions are so many layers beneath the surface upon which law
exists that they are insulated from review. The absence of proce-
dural or constitutional protection for the hiring process, as well
as the absence of hard and fast rules, make it particularly diffi-
cult to change the group dynamic.1 8 7 These group rules make it
hard to prove the discrimination required by law and make it
hard to change the self-perpetuation of the group because
racism, sexism, and homophobia are intermeshed with the group
dynamic. They are the "rules" that exist outside the group and
become incorporated into the group dynamic. Thus the legal
doctrine is unable to adequately address the reality of the situa-
tion-the subtlety of discrimination and the deeply hidden levels
on which it occurs.
The group dynamic of self-perpetuation predominates over
any sense of urgency about the need for integration or diversifi-
cation. The need to act affirmatively to change the status quo is
not a felt need in the context of the group. For those in no rush,
the legal doctrine's inability to reach the deep layers of group
186. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
187. See B. Singley, Clark Kent vs. Superman: A Polemic on the Law Teaching
Fraternity at Harvard University 19 (Fall 1974) (unpublished paper from Professor David
F. Cavers's seminar on Issues in Legal Education at Harvard) (discussing the need for "an
exacting scrutiny" of these decisions) (thanks to Walter Weyrauch for making this paper
available to me); see also Weyrauch, American Law as a Bargaining System, 26 U. FLA.
LAW., Fall 1989, at 14. Weyrauch describes "American law" as a bargaining system which
has several layers:
[T]he law of the appellate courts and of legislation that is visible but of relatively
little significance, except for serving as ideal or directional signal for negotiation;
the law in trial courts ... oriented toward the facts of individual controversies
* * * ; and the law [of] negotiation and settlement . . . that applies in [most]
controversies but is almost invisible. ...
Id. at 17. Weyrauch comments that focusing on law, as the top layer is referred to, is
misleading, but may serve to inspire-this is the abstract ideal of justice. Id. These layers
of law as written and as practiced present a parallel to the hiring dynamic on a law school
faculty. The law layer-nondiscrimination-inspires us, but the reality, several layers
down and visible only through the stories of participants in and survivors of the hiring and
tenure process, reveals other dynamics at work.
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interaction is an advantage. Yet, the metaphor of an ambulance,
which breaks the law by traveling through traffic signals to
render emergency aid, more aptly suggests the kind of response
that the legal system should take to discrimination in American
society.188
When we talk as a law faculty about hiring, people speak
words to each other as a medium of exchange about whom to
hire. These words are the text of our conversations. Certain cri-
teria and phrases are an accepted part of this discourse, which
ostensibly is about the qualifications of the applicant. No one
wants to hire an applicant who is not qualified. And so partici-
pants in the discourse tacitly agree that the conversation is about
qualifications and eliminating the unqualified.
But the conversation that is really going on is a different
one-not at all about qualifications. This sub-text is about,
"Will this person fit into our group, fit into our institution, not
change it in any way that will make me not fit, not hurt my place
in the institution in any way?" It is a conversation that looks to
the future because the participant worries, "If someone comes
who is not like me, will I still be valued at this place, at other
places, or have other opportunities?"
"Mirror, Mirror, on the wall, who's the fairest of them all?"
We are all familiar with the fairy tale chant. The queen is
pleased as long as the mirror answers her question, "You, your
majesty," but she flies into a jealous rage, when the mirror says,
"Snow White." 189 When the other is named, someone different
from herself, as being the most fair, the dominant power cannot
survive. In the fairy tale, the dominant power self-destructs. At
some subliminal level do the culturally dominant fear the intro-
duction of difference as representing their destruction, coming
either from themselves or the outside?1 90
Derrick Bell has recognized this problem in his discussion
of the tipping point issue; for the dominant group the presence of
a few minorities is acceptable, but too many tips the balance at
which the dominant group feels comfortable. 91 The hiring dis-
188. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized 35 years ago the emergency need to end
segregation, urging "all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301
(1955).
189. I am grateful to Charles Lawrence for first pointing out to me the connection
between the mirror and affirmative action.
190. For an interesting introduction to the roles of myth in modem society, see J.
CAMPBELL, THE POWER OF MYTH (B. Flowers 1st ed. 1988).
191. Bell, Tipping Point, supra note 65, at 323-24.
1990] 1671
HeinOnline  -- 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1671 1989-1990
TULANE LAW REVIEW
course tries to place someone on the scale to measure where that
person will weigh in relation to the tipping point. Will the can-
didate really be one of the good old (implicitly white, male,
straight) boys?
And so the faculty debate uses words in the discourse which
involve qualifications; and one must answer in the words they
have established for that discourse, rather than to say, "She's
okay; she won't hurt you." And so rather than speak the words
that the group is truly worried about, we argue about whether
she really is qualified.
A Story About Personal Power and Change
"I'm still confused about the 'whole role of sex' in this hir-
ing problem. The law is not about sex, but there's something
like sexual chemistry at work here," pondered Jessica, as the
group was finishing its meeting.
"What does sex have to do with this? Are you talking
about sexual harassment? In all my years as a professor I have
never experienced a male colleague making any insinuation
whatsoever," Danielle said emphatically.
"Wait a minute, the child abuse statistics alone indicate at
least thirty percent of women are sexually abused. I bet the sex-
ual harassment statistics, if we had accurate ones, would be
equally mindboggling. I just read that twenty-five percent of
California women lawyers surveyed said, 'they have been sub-
jected to sexual harassment in the profession, 11 percent of them
on their current jobs,' "192 said Rita.
"One thing at least this group should be able to agree upon
should be that sexual subordination exists in this culture and
that women are at risk in this area-but that's not what I'm
talking about, really," continued Jessica.
"My therapist is an Asian woman who was raised as a
Catholic and married a Jewish man, and so she has crossed
many cultures. She is fond of pointing out that Western culture
does not have the last word or even an explanation for all
things.193 In fact we have no words for some things that are very
192. Calif Women Lawyers Surveyed, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1989, at 26, 27.
193. See Reisman, supra note 11, at 165 (describing the phenomenon of staring at
someone in a public place when the target of the glance turns to stare back: "How the
target senses the staring, I cannot say, but he almost always does.").
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important. The Hindus call the physical energy Kundalini; 194
Buddhism has another set of names. It's the energy that flows
from the pelvic base, up and out," Ali interjected.
"Are you talking about sexual energy?" '195 Yvonne asked.
"Yes and no. This feeling may be confused with sexual
energy, but it's more than that-it's the power you are exerting
when you speak to a roomful of ninety people." 1 96 answered
Jessica.
"I think it's why male faculty have such a hard time around
us. As men, they are used to responding to that female energy as
sexual or else as someone who has been their mother and nur-
turant or their daughter. At least for our older colleagues, they
haven't experienced women in many other ways, and so they are
confused about how to relate to us. We feel different to them;
just like a roomful of them feels different to us," Jessica
continued.
"This whole conversation is making me feel weird," offered
Virginia.
"I agree," responded Jessica. "It's impossible to talk about
this stuff without sounding like a new age hippie freak."
"Or even worse, a Californian," smiled Constance.
"But," continued Jessica, "think about the feeling inside
you, not just sexually, but whenever you take charge of a class or
commune with a hard-to-write paragraph, when you are really
in touch with your own personal power."
"Like when you get a sick child to take her medicine,"
interjected Sheryl.
194. See generally W. WOLFE, Ar D THE SUN Is UP: KUNDALINI RISES IN THE
WEST (1978).
195. Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2128 (1989). Describing her experience of being the insider, while store
clerks made anti-Semitic remarks, Williams writes,
I grew up in a neighborhood where blacks were the designated Jews. I can think
of few instances, therefore, in which I have ever directly heard the heart, the
source, the uncensored, undramatic day-to-day core of it-heard it as people
think it, and heard it from the position of an "insider." And it was irresistible,
forbidden, almost sexually thrilling to be on the inside.
Id. at 2149.
196. See A. LORDE, Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power, in SISTER OUTSIDER 53
(1984) (describing the erotic as a resource within women that has been devalued and vilified
in western society). "As women, we have come to distrust that power which rises from our
deepest and nonrational knowledge." Id. at 53. "Our erotic knowledge empowers us,
becomes a lens through which we scrutinize all aspects of our existence, forcing us to
evaluate those aspects honestly in terms of their relative meaning within our lives." Id. at
57.
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"And think," continued Jessica, "that we women in West-
ern culture don't even have a name for that. It's so powerful
that we aren't even permitted to name it. It says something
about the importance of this thing to the power of patriarchy
that it has taken away our ability to name it-it must be very
significant."
"What does this all have to do with the problem of getting
women hired at law schools?" asked Danielle.
"Don't you see-the dynamics of personal interaction and
group interaction have as much to do with this whole hiring
problem as any law," answered Rita.
"Are you saying that law is pointless?" asked Yvonne.
"No," said Rita, "it means that law can serve as a model for
behavior. For example, integration should be an ideal, not seg-
regation. And affirmative action is necessary because without it
we'll have segregation. The status quo will just keep rolling on.
Their sense of our differentness is why they will keep us out,
without their necessarily realizing that this is what they are
doing. They are just instinctively looking for more of the same."
Concluding Thoughts: Moving Toward Diversity
As a faculty member faced with one of these "discussions"
about hiring, what can you do to facilitate achieving diversity? 9 7
Recognizing that this is a political process, it is important not to
allow yourself to be silenced. The way in which these discus-
197. There is some reason for concern that women may be less willing to "play the
game" required to affect hiring and promotion. Nadya Aisenberg and Mona Harrington
described the lack of sophistication by women about politics: "They did not... know how
to play the academic game." N. AISENBERG & M. HARRINGTON, supra note 185, at 52.
Understanding the rules of the game is tied to a lack of understanding or a refusal to know
about institutional politics:
In other words, women call themselves "naive" and they mean that they did
not--or still do not-know how to play the academic game, but they also mean
that they rejected-or still reject-the idea that playing games to advance
themselves is necessary. They believed-and still want to believe-that people
advance in the academic profession primarily through merit. And by merit they
mean true merit that includes quality of mind and moral commitment as well as
performance in writing and teaching.
Further they believe that true merit will somehow be evident and recognized
by professional authorities without self-advertisement. They eschew academic
politics-the technique of gaining the notice and support of important people-
assuming that such game-playing is, if anything, self-defeating because it is the
opposite of merit and integrity.
Id. The authors describe this as the merit dream. Id.
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sions concerning faculty hiring take place is another form of
silencing because we are denied the use of words to describe
what is really going on.198 Even efforts to name the discrimina-
tion we see in the cycle of exclusion often fall on unresponsive
ears.
Jessica recalled trying to identify sex discrimination as an
issue to one colleague who replied, "You really have a chip on
your shoulder about sex. You see sexism in everything."
"You think I have a chip on my shoulder about sex? You
should talk to some of my friends," was all Jessica could muster
in response.
But Jessica had been told to be careful about identifying
sexism as an issue in that colleague's presence. 199 He did not
want to hear about it. So Jessica has to be able to talk about
sexism in some other way, with some other words, or not at all.
Yet the words we use are important, framing the conceptualiza-
tion of the debate. That is why this Article has sought to
reclaim the notion of acting affirmatively. And that is why this
Article has told stories. Allegations of sexism, or any other -ism,
are rarely persuasive; but examples from people's lives are. Tell-
ing the stories of the pain caused by the micro- and macro-
aggressions that result from failing to yield to the dominant cul-
tural norms can give new words to the discussion. Stories show
what has been unspoken.
Stories can be told about those outside the dominant cul-
tural majority using their personal power and building coali-
tions200 with others to effect changes in legal education.
Nationally, the founding of the Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues
Section within the AALS is one such story. The passage of
AALS bylaws amendments providing for affirmative action and
nondiscrimination is another.2 ° ' Changes can happen within
individual institutions if individuals within those groups raise
the dynamics to a level of consciousness and discuss them. Con-
198. See generally Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137
(1988); Weiss & Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1299
(1988); Wildman, The Classroom Climate: Encouraging Student Involvement, 4
BERKELEY'S WOMEN'S L.J. 326 (1989-1990); Wildman, supra note 107.
199. "Microsituations are governed by microlaw and microlaw must have sanctions,
though they may be microsanctions." Reisman, supra note 11, at 174.
200. See Reagon, Coalition Politics: Turning the Century, in HOME GIRLS: A BLACK
FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY 356-68 (B. Smith ed. 1983). This is a useful article about
coalitions, addressing both the difficulty of forming them and their importance.
201. See supra note 13.
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sciousness-raising is a first step towards change.20 2 We owe it to
ourselves to proceed so that the other steps can unfold.
The notion of law as ideology or as a psychological phe-
nomenon 203 is particularly important in the area of affirmative
action as it relates to law teaching. As members of law faculties,
we are doing more than teaching a body of "rules and penalties
laid down by agencies of government in order to effectuate their
wil.l" ' 2°4 We, the teachers of the law, influence the consciousness
of law20 5 that our students, as well as others in society, will have.
The legal academy has an opportunity to exemplify diversity in
point of view and leadership in achieving nondiscrimination.
The confusion about meanings of affirmative action 20 6
reflect the ambivalence in the culture, in our collective law-con-
sciousness, and in the colleagues at Holmes Law School about
the meaning of nondiscrimination. What will happen to Theresa
Vallero? Will she be hired? We in legal education can write the
ending to this story and to the many stories like it. If we do
nothing, the status quo or institutional rules as they exist will
operate, and most likely she will not be hired. But we can try to
change that norm.
The challenge of the '90s is to create a legal system that is
just, in the sense of treating like situations alike, yet which also is
responsive to the diverse social realities, the cultural differences,
that are reflected in modem American life. The law must
include us all, or it will not be relevant to the entire community.
In this search we can start with ourselves-the teachers of law.
Because we train the members 'of the profession, we can effect
change by examining our admissions and hiring practices. There
is no place to start like home.
202. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 83-105 (describing consciousness raising
as feminist methodology); see also Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference
Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REV. 751 (1989).
203. See Berman, The Use of Law to Guide People to Virtue: A Comparison of Soviet
and US. Perspectives, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY, supra note
173, ch. 8, at 75 (using the term "psychological phenomenon" to describe law as "primarily
rooted in the intellectual, emotional, and spiritual life of the people of a community"); see
also 'Reich, Law and Consciousness, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 77 (1988) (discusssing the
connection of law and how we see reality).
204. Berman, supra note 203, at 75.
205. Id at 76 (describing other scholars' descriptions of the pattern of entitlements
and bbligations that contribute to each person's law-consciousness).
206. See supra note 16.
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